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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to develop a model of techniques and considerations that can be used by the field of corrections to cope with prison hostage situations. Because of the fact that no two hostage situations will be exactly alike, the considerations and techniques explored are general in nature and will require evaluation and modification in their application to a specific incident. They are specific enough, however, to be used in developing a plan of action before the fact. This model, then, provides a framework on which to build. The study includes a literature review, definitions of terms, and a description of the methodology employed. (Author/BP)

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Neutralization Of Prison Hostage Situations

James P. Needham

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INTRODUCTION

Governments have been faced with hostage situations since at least the third century B.C. Most of the situations throughout history developed because the hostage-taker planned to use the hostage as leverage in securing a favorable peace treaty with the country of the hostage. Various reasons motivated the minority of hostage incidents. Ransom was the motive in the kidnapping of Richard the Lionhearted in 1193. Securing the release of a Soviet agent held by Germany was the motive for the taking of German citizens hostage by the Soviet Union in 1920.

The securing of concessions remains the primary motivation today for taking hostages. A case in point is the demands made by the North Vietnemese for the release of American prisoners of war. Throughout history the leverage enjoyed by hostage-takers depended on two factors. The first factor was the importance of the hostage to the government seeking his release. If an important single hostage could not be secured, the hostage-takers would employ the second factor by taking multiple hostages to increase their bargaining power.

Recent history indicates an increasing interest in hostage situations. Skyjacking and terrorist acts have forced governments into analyzing hostage situations and looking for possible solutions. Skyjacking seems to have been successfully countered by increased security measures. Terrorist acts, however, are still being countered by a variety of measures ranging from force to restraint. Possibly the single most significant event which forced interest in hostage situations was the abduction of Israeli athletes by Arab terrorists at the Olympic Games in Munich in 1972. This event, dubbed as the "Munich Massacre," produced widespread criticism of the Munich police for their handling of the situation. This in itself may not have created a depth of interest in hostage situations if it had not been televised, literally, throughout the entire world. Police departments, expecting similar criticism if faced with a similar situation, initiated study into alternate courses of action to the use of force.

The mood of law enforcement in the search for alternatives to the use of force was favorable. It had just emerged from an era of riots which made many departments question the effectiveness of adopting a policy of force. The late 1960's found the concept of crisis intervention becoming increasingly popular in law enforcement. Crisis intervention, which advocates reduction in tension rather than total suppression, was being applied to idealistic protests with much less resulting destruction of property and injury than the older concept of meeting force with force. The concept of crises intervention was also applied to family disputes with similar success. The number of police officers killed or injured responding to family disputes was reduced drastically in those departments which adopted the crisis intervention philosophy.

The application of crisis intervention techniques to hostage situations is generally credited to the New York City Police Department in a program devised by Detective Harvey Schlossberg, Ph.D. and administered by Lieutenant Frank Bolz.[1] The program, applied successfully in a 1973 New York City hostage incident, gained widespread interest from the law enforcement community and subsequent adoption by several other departments.

Similar interest in hostage situations did not seem to develop in the field of corrections. The 1971 hostage situation of Attica, New York, which was also televised on a widespread basis, ended with mass killings and was the subject of severe criticism by the McKay Commission (**Attica, The Official Report of the New York State Special Commission on Attica,** 1972). Although the Attica incident seemed to parallel the Munich incident, corrections did not seem to feel the same pressure to develop alternatives to force as did law enforcement. A possible answer to this difference may be the way the situation was treated in the news media.

> ... there was a tendency for the large metropolitan papers to be critical of New York officials, the smaller cities and the rural areas suupported the use of force and suggested that it should have been used earlier, while editorials from the middle-sized cities tended to provide a better balance of opinion. The international press was uniformly critical of the way Attica was handled...(Fox, 1972, pp. 40-41).

The fact that most prisons are in smaller cities and rural areas and consume rural news may have somewhat insulated administrators from the criticism and reinforced opinions on the use of force of correctional officers, most of whom had lived all of their lives in the small cities and rural areas in which the prisons are located.

Problem

Prisons in the United State have historically enjoyed non-interference from the courts and support of the public for "get tough" policies. Law enforcement, on the other hand, has had court ordered restrictions placed on them and have suffered from an increasing lack of public support. Law enforcement's search for alternative methods of coping with crisis situations was, no doubt, affected by these factors. One can see the same trend emerging in the field of corrections. The courts have dropped their "hands off" policy and are ordering reforms in physical plants and treatment of inmates. Wardens and other correctional officials are respondents in an increasing number of lawsuits. Public support of corrections is still apparent but special reform groups are increasing in number and the news media is displaying an increasing interest. It is only a matter of time until corrections feels the impact of public interest in the correctional process. Soon corrections will experience pressure to match that

presently placed on law enforcement for increased professionalism in acquitting their duties. The will of the public, the power of the press and the scrutiny of the courts are powerful forces in shaping policy. The problem facing corrections is the adoption of policies and procedures that can withstand court scrutiny and public opinion.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to develop a model of techniques and considerations that can be used by the field of corrections to cope with prison hostage situations. Because of the fact that no two hostage situations will be exactly alike, the considerations and techniques explored are general in nature and will require evaluation and modification in their applicaton to a specific incident. They are specific enough, however, to be used in developing a plan of action before the fact. This model, then, provides a framework on which to build.

Question

This study is structured to answer the following questions:

Question One—Have policies, procedures and considerations been developed by any discipline in the behavioral sciences to include law enforcement and corrections practitioners which will enhance success in coping with hostage situations?

Question Two—If these policies, procedures and considerations have been developed, can they be applied in whole or in part to hostage situations in prisons?

Theoretical Framework

Historically until the twentieth century, hostage situations have been handled by one of two methods. One method was acquiescence to the demands made by the hostage-taker. The other method was the use of force to free the hostages. Neither method is considered a panacea. The former method is likely to produce more hostage situations and the latter is likely to cause death or injury to the hostages. This fact leaves personnel charged with neutralizing hostage situations on the horns of a dilemma. A search is therefore necessitated for an alternative to these two methods.

The decision on which method to use depends largely on a prediction as to what the hostage-taker is likely to do in response to the method selected. A common theme found in the literature is that man is somewhat unable to predict future actions of his fellow man. In the individual case this seems to be true. In the aggregate, however, there is a greater ability to predict behavior. Nierenberg (1973) narrates a case of mass behavior in New York City shortly after World War II. For reasons unknown to the water department, water pressure in the city dropped precariously during evening hours exactly on the hour and half hour. By using a random sample, the city ascertained that the reason for the drop was the simultaneous flushing of toilets at those times. It was not difficult to determine the reason for this phenomena when it was realized that television had just been introduced on a large scale and commercials and station breaks were scheduled on the hour and half hour. While prediction of exactly which person would use a toilet was still impossible, the water department was able to predict when a significant number of its customers would increase their water usage. Armed with the predictability of mass behaviors, the water company was able to develop procedures to counter the water pressure drop.

This study is based on the same theory contained in the mathematical laws of probability. While specific actions may not be applicable to a specific hostage-taker, in the aggregate certain actions are more likely to bring the situation to a successful conclusion. The probability of success is therefore higher. This study is designed to determine which actions are more likely to result in success.

Assumptions

One assumption necessary to this study is the assumption that all hostage situations are basically alike. This does not imply that every hostage situation will mirror every other one. This assumption means that basic similarities exist in hostage situations stemming from the fact that, in all situations, the hostages and hostage-takers are human and susceptible to similar pressure, anxieties, commitment, and motivation. The degree of these elements will vary from situation to situation but they will be present. This assumption is absolutely necessary to allow for generalization. Without it, considerations could not be catalogued and a model could not be developed.

Terms

For clarity of discussion, the meaning of certain terms in this study are defined below:

Control Force—The personnel of a law enforcement agency or correctional institution with or without augmentation by other criminal justice agencies or the National Guard.

Field—The realm of law enforcement and corrections conducting actual criminal justice duties as opposed to the sphere of practitioners involved in criminal justice education and research.

Free World—All that area outside of prison walls.

Hostage Situation—A situation where a person (hostage) is deprived of his liberty by another person (hostage-taker) and they are situated at the same location which is known to the control force.

Model—A preliminary representation serving as the plan from which the final object is constructed.

Transference—That process affecting persons in crisis situations whereby they identify with each other and their attitudes become similar.

Research Design

Method

The author began compiling data for this study in the spring of 1974. At this time he attended the New York City Police Department's Hostage Confrontation Seminar. The author was at that time teaching planning for civil disturbances and neutralization of special threats at the U. S. Army Military Police School, Fort Gordon, Georgia. Hostage situations were included in the curriculum after attendance at the aforementioned seminar. Since the author's students included police and corrections managers as well as active duty and National Guard officers from all three military services, the feedback received during the classes provided additional data for the study. In the fall of 1974, the author conducted interviews with the San Francisco Police Department training officer, commander of the tactical unit and chief hostage negotiator in an attempt to refine the data previously collected. In the fall of 1975, the author conducted a search of the literature on hostage situations and related areas such as terrorism, prison riots, skyjacking, kidnapping, crisis intervention, negotiation, special tactics, decision making and psychology. All the data collected were used to suggest items in the construction of a questionnaire in the spring of 1976. The questionnaire was tested by administering it to the thesis committee and to graduate students whose experience in law enforcement and corrections closely paralleled that found in the field. The original forty-eight item questionnaire was reduced to thirty-one items and items were clarified as a result of the test. The questionnaire was mailed to the police departments of the fifty most populous cities in the United States and the state departments of corrections of each of the fifty states. The returned questionnaires were tabulated and analyzed by calculating total responses, and by separating police and corrections responses. Trends and differences were analyzed by comparision with what exists in the literature and findings produced by previously collected data.

Delimitations

The scope of this study was limited by several factors. The largest limiting factor was the lack of literature in the field. Additionally, much of the literature came from the news media and its validity was more questionable than that of scholarly sources. The lack of literature required the author to develop a questionnaire. Since this was a relatively virgin area of research, the questionnaire had to be developed with each question containing specific but multiple responses. The resulting length of the questionnaire (eight pages, singe spaced, elite type) no doubt discouraged some departments from completing the instrument. A follow-up letter brought only one additional return with the remaining departments indicating that they had already sent it back or it was never received. While it may be that the questionnaires were simply misplaced, the U.S. Postal Service may have been a contributing factor to the response rate. The nature of the subject could also have reduced the return rate. Hostage situations are an area of great sensitivity. While researching the literature, the author came upon notable hostage policies of two police departments. One of these departments later responded to the questionnaire indicating that they did not have any policies. The other department stated it did not want to participate in the study. How widespread this type of response was is subject to speculation. The questionnaire had another inherent limitation. Most of the questions asked required an opinion type answer based on the respondent's experience. What was surveyed then, was attitude which may or may not be an accurate indicator of behavior. Furthermore, the attitudes may have been affected by ideas which may or may not be valid.

This study also suffered somehwat from financial constraints. Although the author studied all available sources of data to include literature from other countries and results of international seminars, a significant source of information was unavailable because of financial constraints. That source was attendance at the Crisis Intervention/Hostage Negotiation Workshop conducted periodically by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc. Furthermore, the author could not identify a reasonably available individual who had attended the workshop in order to obtain an interview.

Realizing the delimitations, the reader is assured that the author has done everything in his power to collect and analyze the findings of this study with the highest degree of objectivity and accuracy possible.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The purpose of this chapter is to search the literature in the field of hostage situations and to report the current thought regarding coping with these situations. This chapter is sub-divided into an overview of the problem, the mission in coping with hostage situations, the execution of the mission, command and communications considerations, and miscellaneous considerations.

One is struck with the lack of literature in the field concerned with hostage situations. Thought, however, is not lacking. That thought is usually included in literature that concerns itself with larger problems such as prison riots and terroristic activities. This literature invariably deals with hostage situations as part of the larger problem rather than as a separate, distinct, major sub-task deserving of an individualized approach. For instance, the United States Government's policy in kidnapping and hostage situations is dictated by the belief that payment of ransom will increase future hostage and kidnapping incidents.

> Tactics vary in each crisis situation, but one consistent factor should be understood by all parties concerned: the United States Government will not pay ransom to kidnappers, nor will it release prisoners to satisfy blackmail demands. We advise other governments, individuals, and companies to adopt similar positions because we believe to do otherwise will multiply terrorist attacks (U.S. Congress, House, **Terrorism, Part 2,** 1974, p. 3136).

Recent literature (post-1972) has narrowed its concern from the larger problems and has addressed the hostage situation itself as a major problem.

Overview

Dr. Wolf Middendorff (December, 1972) provides a historical review of hostage situations from the third century B.C. to the present. Until 1920 hostages were used commonly by nations or warring parties as security for the fulfillment of demands. These demands were usually favorable treaties. If nations could secure relatively important citizens, the number of hostages taken was relatively few. For example, the taking of Richard the Lionhearted by the Duke of Leopold of Austria was sufficient to bring a vast ransom by the people of England. On the other hand, a large number of less important hostages could provide an equally effective bargaining tool. Using this tactic, Barbarossa took three hundred hostages with which he secured a favorable peace treaty with Milan in 1158. The use of hostages by government waned but did not disappear by the Nineteenth Century.

> As recently as 1920, the Soviet Government ordered the arrest of many German citizens as hostages and obtained in this way the release of its agent, Karl Radek, who had been arrested in Germany on charges of political agitation (Middendorff, December, 1972, p. 554).

More recent hostage situations have been categorized according to the motivation of the hostage-taker. The literature (Samuels, 1975; "Hostage Incidents, A Plan of Action," 1974; U.S. Congress, House, **Terrorism, Part 1,** 1974; Culley, 1974), universally agrees that there are three distinct types of hostage-takers. The first type is the terrorist. It is this type that has plagued countries around the world leaving hardly a country untouched by its ramifications. Among the countries affected are Canada by the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ), Argentina by the Argentine Liberation Front, Mexico by the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces, and many countries in the Mid-East and West by the Black September (U.S. Congress, House, **Political Kidnappings, 1968-1973,** 1973). The House Committee on Internal Security in its report **Revolutionary Target: The American Penal System** (1973) concluded that there is a revolutionary attempt to incite riot, violence and terrorism in our penal institutions. Although it could not identify a direct causal relationship between the incitement and the riots, the committee felt that there was some causal relationship. This study of New York, California and Ohio penal institutions identified nineteen separate groups within the institutions exhibiting some degree of revolutionary rhetoric. The McKay Commission felt that revolutionary fervor was not the cause for the Attica riot but conceded that:

> ...the Attica rebels were part of a new breed of younger, more aware inmates, largely black, who came to prison full of deep feelings of alienation and hostility against the established institutions of law and government, enhanced self-esteem, racial pride and political awareness, ... (**Attica, The Official Report of this New York State Special Commission on** Attica, 1972, p. 105).

The point is that this type of hostage-taker cannot be ruled out in either prison or free world hostage situations.

The second type of hostage-taker is described as mentally troubled. An example of this type of hostage-taker is the 1972 skyjacker in Rome whose initial demand was to see the Pope and the American ambassador. Another example is the bank robber in one of our larger cities whose first demand when surrounded was for one thousand pizza pies. These mentally troubled hostage-takers are further divided into the psychotic, the neurotic and the character disorder, sometimes referred to as the psychopath or sociopath. Dr. Herbert B. Fowler (1971) explained that the psychotic is a person who is out of touch with reality while the neurotic suffers from extreme anxiety and depression. The person suffering from a character

disorder, on the other hand, is relatively anxiety-free. This type shows no guilt for his actions and is unable to form personal bonds of friendship or love[2]

The third category of hostage-taker is described as the professional criminal. This type, also known as the dyssocial offender, exhibits a lifelong pattern of crime. He becomes a hostage-taker by coincidence when he is surprised by authorities in the commission of a crime and takes hostages in an attempt to secure his freedom[3]

Samuels (1975) lists these types in priority of occurrence in free world situations with the mental case being the most common, followed by the professional criminal in second place with the revolutionary being last. No corresponding study could be found concerning prison hostage situations.

The literature differentiates between these three modern day types of hostage-takers because the techniques used to deal with them differ. Although hostage-takers seldom clearly fall into only one of the categories, techniques successfully used on one type may trigger violence from another type.

While the nature of hostage situations has been changing over the years, so has the criminal justice system's response. Perhaps the clearest example of the changing philosophy in the field has been the changing approach to riot control in the United States. An 1884 manual on riot control states that "crushing power exercised relentlessly and without hesitation is really the merciful, as it is the necessary, course to be pursued" (Molineux, 1884, p. 15). This was the technique used against rioters in the New York City draft riot of 1863.

> The authorities were unable to ascertain how many were killed because of their policy of taking no prisoners. They would charge a crowd, cracking heads, firing if they were fired upon, and occasionally sweeping the streets with grapeshot if howitzers were available. The fallen were left in the streets to be carried away by their comrades and either buried or nursed back to health. Only 20 prisoners were taken during the entire riot (compared with 3,952 during Watts) and 19 of those were convicted on 3 August of various charges arising from their participation in the riot (Litchfield, 1975, p. 50).

The riots of the 1960's were handled with Molineux's philosophy regarding the use of force except the level of force used was much lower. Due to the continued disturbances, the late 1960's brought about a new philosophy in handling riots. This concept was called "confrontation management," a concept which soon was applied to other aspects of law enforcement. "Confrontation management has as its primary objectives intensity reduction rather than total suppression. By reducing the strength, force and energy of the crowd the risk of violence is reduced" (Morgan, 1971, p. 20). The basic philosophy embodied in confrontation management was expanded and is now labeled in the literature as crisis intervention and conflict management as well as by its original name. The most fruitful application of this approach in law enforcement has been its use in domestic disturbances or family disputes (Murphy, McKay, Schwartz & Liebman, 1975).

The handling of prison riots likewise has undergone a change in philosophy over the years. Dr. G. David Garson's historical analysis (1972) of prison riots documents this shift. The early prison riots (1865-1913) were universally resolved by the use of force by the state. "A policy of restraint-isolating the rioters, negotiating with them, or waiting them out was not pursued in any of these early riots" (Garson, 1972, p. 412). In the next two prison riot waves (1929-1930 and 1952-1955), Garson found that a pattern developed where the state would use force when hostages were not involved and use restraint when hostages were involved. The 1968 to 1971 wave of riots indicated another shift of policy. There was more force than restraint used to quell these disorders. Garson attributes this to the nation's law and order reaction which followed the urban riots and campus disorders of the 1960's.

Garson further found that "... with only one exception which occurred nearly half a century ago - hostages have never been killed by inmates **regardless** of what action the state takes" (Garson, 1972, p. 419). This finding applies only to the use of force or restraint to quell the disorder. Garson points out that hostages have been killed before the state moved to quell the disorder and inmates who are killed are usually killed at the initial stages of a riot when other inmates retaliate for long standing grievances.

The philosophy of interpersonal relations is not the only aspect of the criminal justice system that has undergone change. Law enforcement and corrections organizations have become more complex as the era of specialization affected the criminal justice system. The medium-sized and larger cities can no longer function in law enforcement with the chief of police directly supervising the watches. A police department of today may have some or all of the following divisions in its organization: patrol, intelligence, internal affairs, traffic, data processing, records, communications, detention, recruitment, youth, women, investigations, vice, research and tactical (Eastman and Eastman, 1969). Corrections has also undergone changes caused by specialization. The warden no longer exercises direct supervision only over the guards. The typical correctional institution of today may include all of the following personnel: correctional officer, psychologist, chaplain, psychiatrist, physician, dentist, social case worker, guidance counselor, psychotherapist, vocational rehabilitation counselor, alcoholism counselor, parole officer and educator.

Although hostage situations have occurred since at least the third century B.C., it has only been since 1972 that serious thought has been exercised in dealing with these situations. The incident that initiated significant thought concerning hostage incidents, was the situation at the Munich Olympic Games on September 5, 1972, in which eight Arab terrorists held nine Israeli athletes hos-

tage. The incident ended that night with the death of all nine hostages, five terrorists, and one policeman and the capture of the remaining three terrorists (Schreiber, 1974). There were several reasons that this incident, although this was not the first of terrorist type activities, set into motion the imagination of criminologists regarding this type of crime. Probably the key reason was the fact that literally the entire world watched the incident on television. Those in positive authority in the criminal justice field initiated research, not wanting a similar situation occurring in their jurisdiction.

The model for dealing with hostage situations, then, is a relatively new model, not thoroughly tested since many still unknown aspects await verification in this area.

Mission

The first step in developing a model is to develop a clear definition of what it is supposed to do. The literature regarding hostage situations is filled with the word "success." The operational definition, for the most part, is left to the researcher to assume. The literature clearly implies that a successful mission is one in which the hostages are freed unharmed. In literature regarding prison hostage situations, rarely does the writer suggest that the apprehension of the hostage-taker is equally important or has sub-importance. For instance, Vernon Fox (1972) described the mission of the control force after hostages have been taken in these terms: "After that, discretion and the safety of the hostages becomes central" (p. 41). This lack of addressing the question of apprehension of the hostage-taker is probably because correctional writers assume correctional officials will not grant freedom to hostage-takers. "What prisoners usually demand in a hostage situation is freedom. This is normally a non-negotiable demand either by strong policy or state law" (Hassel, 1975, p. 57). It is probably accurate to state that corrections sees the mission in a hostage situation as twofold: to insure the safety of the hostages and to apprehend the hostage-takers.

Police departments consider the mission in generally the same vein (Kobetz, 1975). It is clear, however, that police departments generally place more importance on the life saving aspect of this twofold mission. As the commander of the New York City Police Department Hostage Unit put it, "Our main goal is to save lives—of hostages, of policemen, of bystanders" (The Hostage Squad," 1974, p. 90). This philosophy seems to have widespread acceptance in police circles. The basic principles of the Criminal Police of Cologne, Germany, state: "The protection of the lives and the physical well-being of hostages and innocent bystanders has absolute priority over the apprehension of offenders or the safeguarding of property" (Middendorff, November, 1974, p. 5). This philosophy is probably best summed up by an American policeman who stated:

> ... if worse comes to worse, if there is nothing else we can do we permit him to escape. ... The way I look at it is there are a million unsolved crimes in [city name]. Tomorrow there will be a million and one. What difference does it make? Property and damage is recoverable, money is replaceable but the life of that hostage, there is nothing we can do to give it back to him (Source withheld to protect confidentiality).

This is perhaps the philosophy stated in the extreme and as a last recourse. Certainly a concerted effort is made to follow the escaped hostage-taker and effect an apprehension after the hostage is released. The basic idea is that police action will not be the causative factor in the killing or injuring of the hostages.

The literature generally agrees that the safety of the hostages is of paramount importance but disagrees as to whether the apprehension of the hostage-taker should be a mission of equal importance or of secondary importance.

Execution of Mission

The execution of the mission is normally subdivided into two major tasks. These tasks are tactical tasks and negotiation tasks.

Tactical Tasks

A survey of several police department's tactical manuals and the Oregon Board on Police Standards' **Sniper Suppression and Building Clearance Manual** (1968) reveal that the tactics used by police departments in handling snipers, barricaded persons and hostage-takers are a modification of military tactics in attacking a built-up area. These tactics can be found in Department of the Army **Field Manual 31-50, Combat in Fortified and Built-Up Areas** (1964) with change two (1970). The modification of the tactics to apply to police situations are located in Department of the Army **Field Manual 19-15, Civil Disturbances** (1972). This manual contains sections on Special Reaction Teams (SRT), known as Special Weapons and Tactics Teams (SWAT) or Tactical Units in civilian police jargon. The section of the manual on antisniping reflects the tactics presently used by most police departments to cope with special police problems to include hostage-taking.

The approach emphasizes a planned, controlled reaction. All control force personnel responding to a hostage situation have the primary responsibility of securing the area. They do this by the use of road blocks and checkpoints which are to keep uninvolved personnel out of the area and to seal off escape routes. The isolated area is then evacuated of residents and bystanders. A safe escape route is designated in the evacuation order and all evacuees are screened to insure the hostage-taker is not one of them. This screening technique was used successfully by the San Francisco Police Department in December, 1974, when they apprehended one of two hostage-takers as he posed as a released hostage (Jen-

nings, 1974). If evacuation is impractical, all residents are warned to seek cover, remain immobile and to stay away from all exposed areas.

Communications are established with all members of the control force to include observers who are strategically placed in positions advantageous to observation and to report the actions of the hostage-taker. The senior member of the control force on the scene also has the responsibility to establish a field command post, a communications center (usually located with the command post), and a staging area for emergency and support equipment and personnel. The actual search of the area and apprehension of the hostage-taker is left to the Special Reaction Unit or SWAT team.

The Special Reaction Unit is briefed on the situation through the use of maps, drawings and knowledgeable residents. From this information they develop an assault plan. One half of the team, called the Security Element, is used to develop an inner perimeter which covers all exits from the area and observes the hostage-taker. When they are in position, the Special Reaction Unit commander issues warnings and instructions to the hostage-taker allowing sufficient time for voluntary surrender. The next step is to attempt to force the hostage-taker into the open by saturating the area with chloro-benzalononitrile (CS) gas. If this does not force the surrender of the hostage-taker or force him into a position where he can be apprehended, the other half of the Special Reaction Unit, called the Action Element, enters the general area occupied by the hostage-taker and isolates him in a specific area. The Action Element is to affect the apprehension using minimum force which would include the use of CS gas prior to entry or use of firepower.

These tactics have a major disadvantage in that the assault of the hostage-taker's position may cause him to kill the hostages. With this in mind, law enforcement agencies have been searching for nonlethal weapons which may be used as an alternative to customarily used firearms.[4] While the present inventory of nonlethal weapons may have application in any specific hostage situation, there is still a need for one weapon which has not been developed yet. The weapon needed is a gas which instantly incapacitates but has no risk of permanent impairment to individuals exposed to it. It must be undetectable, unlike the present chemical weapons. In situations where the hostages are being held in a closed area and a sufficient concentration of the gas could be built up, the control force could surreptitously introduce the gas into the area; then make the apprehension after it has incapacitated the hostage-taker.

Current police thought has further modified present tactics in the case of hostage situations, a modification which has also been increasingly used in sniping and barricaded persons incidents. The modification is that instead of issuing warnings and instructions to the hostage-taker, non-threatening lines of communication are opened with the hostage-taker. The remaining tactics discussed in the previous section will only be used if the communications are exhausted and even then, the control force may opt to allow the hostage-taker to "escape" and follow him hoping for a tactical or psychological advantage in doing so.

Negotiation Tasks

Negotiation is a result of the acceptance of the confrontation management philosophy of the late 1960's. The goals of confrontation management, intensity reduction rather than total suppression, are accomplished by "minimizing the chances of expansion or escalation of the confrontation, channeling the confrontation into an acceptable form, and allowing time to dissipate the confrontation" (Morgan, 1971, p. 20). The concept of negotiation did not have the favor of law enforcement and corrections officials prior to the late 1960's. As a 1953 American Prison Association report on Prison Riots and Disturbances points out, in theory it is not proper to negotiate with mutineers. The report further stated, however, that "This does not mean that some appropriate official should not discuss the situation with them and attempt to get the hostages released by peaceful means" (American Prison Association, 1953, p. 21).

Present thought concerning negotiations would interpret the American Prison Association's stand as both encouraging and discouraging negotiation. The word negotiate has developed a different connotation since 1953. **The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Gazzette** indicated that "Negotiation means TALK" ("Hostages: A Viewpoint," p. 11). Ilich defined negotiation as "conferring between individuals" (1973, p. 18). Nirenberg pointed out that "Whenever people exchange ideas with the intention of changing relationships, whenever they confer for agreement, they are negotiating" (1973, p. 4). It would seem then that the word "negotiation" may have had a more expanded meaning prior to the late 1960's, including the idea of yielding to the criminal which may explain why the American Prison Association rejected it and which may further explain why some criminal justice officials today are reluctant to adopt it as a hostage situation strategy. It seems to have been adopted more fully by the law enforcement community than the corrections community even though it has been only recently (post-1970) that literature on negotiations has been published. As Nirenberg pointed out:

> Up to the present time, no general theories were available to guide an individual in his day-to-day negotiating activities. All too frequently we have had to learn to negotiate the same way we learned such things as sex—by trial and error (1973, p. 5).

Although the literature relating to negotiation now contains some sophisticated strategies, the strategy of negotiations in hostage situations is a strategy of stalling for time. The time is used to allow control force personnel to contain the area and to gather intelligence on the hostage-taker, the hostages and the area in which the control force is operating. Since most police departments

use the situational context in dealing with hostage situations, accurate intelligence forms the basis for all actions.[5] Since a hostage situation is characterized by high emotional tension for all concerned, including the hostage-taker, time plays another important function. "The passage of time generally serves to reduce anxiety thus permitting the felon to assess the situation rationally" ("Hostage Incidents, A Plan of Action," 1974, p. 15). Negotiations are used, instead of simply containing the situation, because it is felt that by allowing the hostage-taker to verbally ventilate his feelings, his thinking is slowed. He has to put his fear and apprehensions into words and thereby reduces anxiety as he is forced into organizing his thoughts. Simply containing the situation, without allowing ventilation, may increase anxiety which may be released through violent action.

Peter Clyne described how this technique was used in Austria:

> In dealing with 'ordinary' kidnappers, who hold someone to ransom for money or to effect an escape, the Viennese have developed an approach which for some reason they call the Salami technique. It may be defined as 'promise him everything, but give him nothing.'
>
> The criminal is approached in a friendly way and told that his demands will be met. Unfortunately, the bank isn't open yet. When it does open, one finds with regret that the required sum isn't in the safe, or that the safe key is missing. ... As difficulty after difficulty keep cropping up, the terrorists and the police work amiably together to try to overcome them. Boredom, the passage of time and an apparent willingness to co-operate tend to diffuse the situation, make it less tense and gradually stifle the willingness to kill.
>
> ... No hostage has ever been harmed after the Salami technique has gone on ... and on ... and on. The necessary 'mood' for the killing is no longer there, and in time the criminal gets thoroughly fed up with the whole thing and throws down his cards. 'Well, since it's you, old boy,' one kidnapper recently said to the Viennese Commissioner of Police, surrendering himself and his hostages after thirty-six hours of the Salami game (1973, pp. 146-147).

Stalling for time may produce some unusual unplanned advantages for the control force. One of these advantages is the escape of the hostages. Donald F. Cawley, in his article "Anatomy of a Siege" (1974), explained how the waiting technique resulted in the escape of all the hostages without injury. After forty-three hours of containment and negotiations, nine hostages seized upon the opportunity of a distraction of the hostage-takers to escape to the roof by the use of a long unused stairway that had been sealed off by plasterboard. The escape of hostages is not unusual but is not the predominant method of ending hostage situations.

Another advantage that may accrue is that the hostage-taker may get exhausted and fall asleep. In three separate cases this occurred which allowed the control force to simply walk into the room and make the apprehension. These cases involved sole hostage-takers, however, and it is unlikely that multiple hostage-takers would all go to sleep at the same time, although it has happened ("Hostage Incidents, A Plan of Action," 1974).

Many other advantages may accrue to the control force if, while waiting, they are alert to take advantage of any mistakes made by the hostake-taker. The release of seven hostages in the Washington, D.C. jail in July, 1974, was made possible by the laxness of the hostage-takers and the alertness of the control force and hostages. The hostage-takers allowed the control force to send in a sanitary napkin to the lone female hostage. Inside the napkin, authorities had secreted a key to the cell block elevator. When one hostage-taker was asleep and the other was negotiating on the telephone, the hostages used the key to make good their escape ("Jail Break Replay," 1974, p. 38).

Time plays yet another role which is advantageous to the control force and hostages. The literature reveals that the longer that hostages and their abductors are together, the less likely the abductors are to harm the hostages. This has been called transference (Cully, 1974; Balton, 1976) and has also been referred to as the Stockholm Syndrome (Hassel, 1975) after an incident in Stockholm, Sweden. In this Swedish incident four hostages were held in a bank vault for six days and after release, several expressed strong attachment for their captors to the point of refusing to testify against them and later visiting them in prison. This transference works both ways. In an interview with the hostage-taker in prison, he was asked if he actually had it in mind to kill the hostages.

> In the beginning, I could have easily. I was keyed up with my plan. Maybe I should have. After I gave up, there were police who told me that if I had killed just one of the hostages I could have a plane out of Sweden. But I didn't need the police to tell me that. I knew it for myself. ... It was the hostages' fault. They did everything I told them to do. If they hadn't, I might not be here now. Why didn't any of them attack me? They made it hard to kill. They made us going on living together day after day, like goats, in that filth. There was nothing to do but get to know each other (Lang, 1974, p. 126).

This is not an isolated example of transference. The literature abounds with similar incidents.[6] Transference, then, is the establishment of an inter-personal relationship between the hostage and the hostake-taker. It is usually a positive relationship and prevents the hostage-taker from injuring or killing his hostage. This bond, together with associated psychological pressures, can become so strong that the hostages tend to view the control force as enemies and the hostage-takers as their protectors (O'Brien, 1976). Unless understood, this phenomenon can confuse and affect the morale of the control force.

In some cases it may be a negative relationship called counter-transference. Counter-transference could cause the hostage to be in greater danger of injury or death. There is some evidence that counter-transference was the reason that one of the hostages aboard the train at Assen, The Netherlands, in December, 1975, was brought to the door and shot through the neck during the negotiations. The Moluccan terrorists subsequently surrendered after thirteen days and freed twenty-three other hostages ("Siege in Holland," 1975). The hostage that was shot had apparently been very argumentative towards the terrorists and the inter-personal relationship that had built up was a negative one rather than a positive one (Snyder, 1976).

Middendorff pointed out the conditions in which transference is most likely to occur. "The best arrangement for a bloodless denouement is one in which male criminals hold female hostages captive, there are no conversational difficulties between them and the social differences are slight" (April, 1974, p. 147). O'Brien (1976) pointed out that two of the Mexican-American hostage-takers in the 1974 prison hostage incident at Huntsville, Texas, were extremely uneducated and had great difficulty speaking English. These two were not subject to transference throughout the entire eleven day ordeal. The third hostage-taker, who was more intelligent and spoke English well, seemed to be subject to transference with the female hostages but not the male hostages. Nevertheless, he killed at least one female hostage when his escape plans were foiled. The variable that dictated this action was the fact that the third hostage-taker was diagnosed as a psychopath. One of the traits exhibited by a psychopath is an inability to develop warm feelings for anyone. The apparent rapport developed with the female hostages was a veneer which did not affect his final actions.

While it may be said that transference will not be a factor in which one of the the parties is a psychopath, the fact is that "pure" psychopaths, just as any "pure" typology, exist in theory more often than fact. What is more often the case is a person who tends to display psychopathic tendencies and is more unable than others to develop warm feelings for anyone. The question then seems to be the degree of psychopathy rather than the absolute state. It may be that transference and counter transference will actually occur with a person exhibiting psychopathic tendencies over a longer period of time. The literature reveals that nothing seems to work with a "pure" adult psychopath. In such a case, the passage of time would have little influence on the likelihood of the hostage being injured by the psychopathic hostage-taker.

Counter-transference may have an influence on present thought regarding negotiations after a hostage has been killed. Current thought is that "Once they throw out the first body, it's an entirely different situation. They're going to kill them all" (Arenberg, undated, post-1974). Under this theory, the control force should change tactics from negotiation to another option, such as assault or fire by selected marksmen, to save as many of the hostages as they can. If the reason for the killing of the hostage stems from counter-transference, however, the best method of insuring the safety of the remaining hostages may still be by negotiations. Additional research is needed, however, to verify or negate this contention. The Moluccan terrorists incident in the the Netherlands remains the only incident where the control force successfully terminated the situation by negotiations after a hostage had been killed **subsequent** to the opening of negotiations. There have been many incidents, however, where negotiations were successful even though the hostage-taker had killed a hostage or member of the control force **before** negotiations were opened.

Besides reducing anxiety of the hostage-taker, negotiations also provide information to the control force. To law enforcement this information may be as basic as the identity of the hostages and their abductors. In prison hostage situations, where this type of information is more likely to be known, the identity of the inmate who has assumed informal leadership of the inmates will prove valuable in developing negotiation strategy. The strategy of negotiations will, to a large extent, depend on the typology of the hostage-taker—mentally troubled, professional criminal or the terrorists.

The psychotic and the neurotic classifications of the mentally troubled hostage-taker should be handled so as to reduce the stress they are under. Samuels (1975) recommends a low key approach with these cases. The negotiator should be a good listener, never arguing. The hostage-taker should be kept talking, allowing himself the opportunity of developing solutions to his problem. The negotiator may also suggest solutions, being careful not to aggravate the situation by exciting him.

One negotiator, who faced a mentally deranged man who was holding his seven-year-old son hostage, found that these techniques worked for him. In his words,

> I discovered that the diversions aimed at stimulating the creative thinking process invariably succeeded. The theory that stimulating conversation by the suspect can result in more rational negotiation also proved to be accurate (Source withheld to protect confidentiality).

The psychopath, as previously discussed, presents a more formidable problem. Not only is transference not likely to occur, but the psychopath can be extremely clever and shrewd and should not be underestimated. Dialogue can be more normal than when dealing with the psychotic or the neurotic since the psychopath is not mentally ill in the traditional sense. The negotiator should be prepared, however, for bizzare behavior periodically. There is the chance that during the course of the negotiations, the psychopath will make a mistake that the negotiator or the control force can capitalize on.

Negotiations with the professional criminal type of hostage-taker can be more business-like because this type is more rational and exhibits more logical reasoning. Care should be taken to lower his anxiety level after which a calm dialogue may be entered into regarding the situation

and the alternatives. Samuels (1975) recommends that the limits of cooperation be clearly stated but that time limits not be set unless it is intended that they be met. Time limits may unduly restrict the negotiations and may destroy the credibility of the negotiator should it be decided later not to enforce them.

The terrorist hostage-taker presents as formidable a challenge as does the psychopath. If the psychopath is a rebel without a cause, the terrorist is a rebel with a cause. It is this "cause" that plays the most important role in the negotiation process. The dedicated terrorist will choose martyrdom in lieu of surrender if that action will further the cause. The terrorist is, however, dependent on the news media to spread the information on the cause. If the event is not publicized or is downgraded in importance, the terrorist is less likely to make the sacrifice. "The Marxist view is such that a sacrifice without the cooperation of the press would be useless" (Hassel, 1975). In these situations there should also be a low visible police and media presence to preclude the terrorists being provoked to violent action out of an inflated sense of importance (Samuels, 1975). The negotiator should "depoliticalize" the situation by steering the negotiations away from the political considerations and to the realities at hand. This can be done by offering reasonable alternatives to impossible demands (Samuels, 1975).

Another function of negotiations is to determine what will motivate the hostage-taker to release his hostages and surrender. Often the initial demand, which may be viewed by the control force as non-negotiable, may not be the only concession that will end the drama. Samuels (1975) narrated a situation in which a skyjacker's demands were for a huge sum of money, parachutes and escape:

> After talking with him, the second negotiator offered him plastic surgery to reduce the size of the man's nose. The skyjacker accepted and the drama ended. What had happened was that the first negotiator had failed to realize that the subject's preoccupation with the ridicule he had received because of his prominent nose was the key to the reward he sought. He wanted escape and the money would buy that for him. The money was necessary until an alternative was offered him—the operation (p. 3).

Another incident was ended when the negotiator offered to fly the hostage-taker's mother into the city for a reunion after his surrender (**San Francisco Examiner**, 1974). This ability to modify demands is especially important in prison hostage situations where the demands are often numerous and not within the authority of prison officials to grant. Fox (1956), who negotiated the 1952 hostage situation at the State Prison of Southern Michigan at Jackson, was faced with this problem. For instance, one of the demands was to abolish the parole board and let everyone either serve a flat time sentence or be automatically released on parole after expiration of a specified length of the sentence. This demand was clearly not within the purview of the prison officials to grant and may have caused an impasse. Fox, however, was able to reduce this demand to a letter asking the parole board to revise its procedures to give equal treatment to all parolees. Simlar modifications were made with all demands so that the prison authorities could "live with" the agreement.

Because of the varied tasks required of a negotiator under enormous stress, consideration should be given to his rank. Although a chief of police, warden, mayor or governor all exercise power which may be an advantage in negotiation, it may also prove to be a detriment.

> This very important point was summarized succinctly by an Air Force General who said, 'When a troop spits on me, the entire Air Force must reply; when he spits on a Second Lieutenant, we all write it off as a dumb Second John who shouldn't have gotten into that spot in the first place. By committing my young officers first, we remain flexible and my influence is preserved for the critical moment' (Samuels, 1975, p. 3).

Another danger in committing a power figure as a negotiator is the possibility of him being taken as a hostage during face-to-face negotiations. This event puts the hostage-takers into a more advantageous bargaining position regardless of policies which strip authority from the power figure in the event he is taken as a hostage.

Further, the commitment of the power figure with decision making authority as a negotiator subjects him to undue emotional stress which may taint his decisions. The literature (Ilich, 1973; Karrass, 1974) agrees that the negotiator should be a semi-authoritative figure without final decision making authority or decision making authority only within limits set by the power figure. This limited authority is actually a source of power to the negotiator in that the limits placed on him actually shift the problem back to the hostage-taker for solution. The negotiator can also say no gracefully and non-threateningly because it is not he who is saying no, it is the power figure.

Besides the rank of the negotiator, his personal traits, experience and training are important considerations. There is little agreement in the literature as to what personal traits a good negotiator should possess. Chester L. Karrass, in his book **The Negotiating Game** (1970) listed the following traits:

1. Planning skill
2. Ability to think clearly under stress
3. General practical intelligence
4. Verbal ability
5. Product knowledge
6. Personal integrity
7. Ability to perceive and exploit power
8. Feeling of self-worth
9. High tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty (p. 36-37).

On the other hand, the New York City Police Department which has the nation's largest hostage negotiating team uses the following criteria:

1. Volunteers only
2. Good physical condition
3. Mature appearance
4. Good speaking voice
5. Skilled interrogator
6. Representative of various ethnic and racial groups with, if possible, the ability to speak a foreign language (Culley 1974, p. 12).

The difference in emphasis is not as great as it appears. Mr. Karrass is evaluating the traits of an accomplished negotiator. The New York City Police Department outlines their initial requirements, which it then supplements with a training program, to develop a negotiator with much the same traits as Mr. Karrass outlined. The training program includes psychological training, physical training, firearms training, electronic equipment training, training in the use of an armored personnel carrier and auxiliary equipment, training in vehicle operation and liaison with other law enforcement and investigative agencies. The program also allows for periodic retraining (Culley, 1974).

Even though the New York City Hostage Negotiating Team has two female members (Culley, 1974), the literature is devoid of reference to the relative effectiveness of negotiators based on sex. The literature does point out the importance of empathy, rapport and being non-threatening in the negotiation process. It would seem that females might have an advantage in these traits. Morris and Hawkins (1969) point out that "In some parts of the United Kingdom women have been employed as traffic wardens, and it is reported that their activities are much less resented than are those of male wardens" (p. 106). Futhermore, studies have indicated that women are better observers than males and that good observers are good judges. Smith (1966) evaluated several experiments and concluded:

> Our tentative explanation for the consistent female superiority...is found in the emphasis upon greater social facility for the female sex role with the concomitant development of better skills. The superiority of women is due to their greater interest in observing people (p. 119).

With the increased numbers of females in law enforcement and expected rises of females in corrections, their use as negotiators should be explored. It should be kept in mind, however, that the new role of women in society may have a mitigating effect on the superiority they presently enjoy in observing and judging. Equality of opportunity may in time cause equality of ability.

No matter how skilled the negotiator, there is always the possibility that he will be unable to accomplish the negotiation tasks. For this reason, normally, more than one negotiator is initially committed. The New York City Police Department assigns seven negotiators to hostage incidents.

> The reason seven negotiators are utilized is that two are needed as communicators—one member is the primary communicator whose responsibility it is to establish rapport and voice identification with the felon, the second member assists in developing patterns of questions, analyzes the entire situation, and communicates with the command post- -and the other five members are assigned as follows: as reliefs, as secondary negotiators should the first team be unsuccessful at establishing rapport, to operate escape and chase vehicles if necessary, and to function as a containment team at a new location should the felon move the hostage (Culley, 1974, pp. 13-14).

Another reason for using more than one negotiator is to monitor the mood of the primary negotiator. The combination of the frustrations of the situation, coupled with the lack of sleep, may cause the primary negotiator to get emotional. This in turn may effect his judgment and his rapport with the hostage-taker.

The literature (O'Leary, 1973; Nierenberg, 1973; Ilich, 1973; Karrass, 1974) universally agrees that the place of the negotiations should be on the control force's home ground or if that is not practical then on neutral ground. Ilich (1973) points out that the negotiator "can thus concentrate more on the game rather than burning up energy adapting to the new surroundings" (p.23). Regarding prison hostage situations, O'Leary (1973) noted, "For those who represent the prisoners, meeting in plain view of their constituency might disrupt the talks, since there would be a strong influence to engage in theatrics and politics rather than hard negotiations" (p. 39).

Realistically, it is often the hostage-taker who dictates the area of the negotiations. If this is the case, consideration should be given to conducting negotiations via the telephone, electronic communication, notes or messengers instead of using face-to-face communications. Each technique has its limitations such as security and clarity but it does not reduce the negotiator's leverage nor does it subject the negotiator to being captured and made a hostage.

The role of the news media during the negotiations is a sensitive subject. There is a possibility that the recording and reporting of information on the negotiations may actually hinder the negotiations. The McKay Commission study of the 1971 Attica riot concluded that:

> The presence of television cameras and the press has a tendency to encourage rhetoric rather than serious concessions. ... To maximize chances of agreement, negotiations must be conducted privately without the presence of the press, but with appropriate briefings to the press (**Attica, The Official Report of the New York State Special Commission on Attica,** 1972, p. 213).

The National Council on Crime and Delinquency's study on **Peaceful Resolution of Prison Conflict** reached the same conclusions (O'Leary, 1973).

If rigid stands on demands and concessions are released to the press, both sides are less likely to reduce demands or make concesssions than if these positions were taken in private (Fox, 1972). For this reason press releases of demands and concessions should be worded in a general manner until the final agreement is reached.

The media can play a positive role in lending credibility to the negotiations but should not be used by the control force unless it is sure of the action that will be taken by reporters. This is only accomplished by prior liaison and coordination with the media over a long period to build up mutual trust, confidence and respect. Since the media is a major power in shaping world opinion, this prior coordination can reap large dividends when the control force is faced with hostage situations and other sensitive special problems.

Which demands are non-negotiable vary widely and are based more on opinion rather than research. New York City seems to have the most liberal policy. "Practically all demands are negotiable but one—supplying firearms. If the desperado is bluffing with an unloaded or bogus weapon, giving him a gun would truly create the threatened danger" ("Hostage incidents, A Plan of Action," 1974, p. 14). Normally prison policy or state law make the escape of inmates a non-negotiable demand. It has also been suggested that replacement hostages be non-negotiable for two reasons. The first reason is that the replacement hostage will have no transference with the hostage-taker initially. Furthermore, if a uniformed officer or an administrator is the replacement hostage, the building up of transference will be hindered. The second reason is that the hostage-taker may try to "trade up," that is, exchange a hostage with little authority for one with more authority or prestige. This presents the control force with the dilemma of how far up can they trade? Can they allow a trade of a guard for a warden; then the warden for the governor, etc.? This dilemma can be solved by making replacement hostages non-negotiable. Other non-negotiable items may be dictated by the particular situation at hand. These should be evaluated more on their ability to solve the situation that on considerations such as face-saving, setting a precedent or acting as a deterrent. Realistically the latter three considerations have a significant effect on determining which demands are non-negotiable. Prison policy of not allowing the hostage-taker freedom and in some cases refusing amnesty are both dictated by the deterrent effect that these policies provide. The same is true for the United States government's policy of making the payment of ransom non-negotiable. The question of whether these policies actually act as a deterrent cannot be answered at this time.

Command and Communication

The importance of command and communications at a hostage incident cannot be overemphasized. The manpower mobilized to neutralize these situations may come from various sources and various political subdivisions. These sources may operate with differing philosophies. In addition to manpower, other resources such as fire fighting, medical, demolitions experts, heavy equipment operators, etc., may be needed and must be controlled. The article "Hostage Incidents, A Plan of Action" (1974), pointed out that these varied resources should be utilized as "... a well coordinated team approach during which it is crucial that one superior officer be in command and effective communications amoung units be maintained" (p. 13). This principle of unity of command is among the principles of war of most of the nations in the world and is defined as follows:

> Unity of Command. The decisive application of full firepower requires unity of command. Unity of command obtains unity of effort by the coordinated action of all forces toward a common goal. While coordination may be obtained by cooperation, it is best achieved by vesting a single commander with the requisite authority (Matloff, 1968, p. 7).

While the military has the advantage of planning for specific operations and taking into consideration such things as unity of command, chain of command, authority and limits to authority, specific objectives, attachments and detachments, etc., departments facing hostage situations may be faced with the problem for the first time and may not have put a great deal of thought into these considerations. These are vitally important considerations to the success of the mission and cannot be left until the occurrence of the situation to develop. The department will find itself much too enmeshed in the situation to give considered thought to the area of command and may find itself operating on assumptions about who is in command which may prove false when a crucial order must be given or a decision made. While cooperation from all segments of the control force may be excellent, as it was in the 1974 prison escape attempt and hostage situation in Huntsville, Texas (Estelle, 1976), it may also fall apart as it did in Attica in 1971. The McKay Commission (**Attica, The Official Report of the New York State Special Commission on Attica,** 1972) reported:

> Although high ranking state officials from several agencies were on the scene at Attica, the entire planning of the police action to retake the institution was left to the local State Police troop commander. In devising the tactical plan, he could use only the personnel and equipment available to the State Police and did not have the benefit of advice or review by civilian or military authorities (p. 333).

The McKay Commission concluded that the plan and execution of the plan had some serious flaws, not the least of which was the failure to make adequate provisions in

advance for the evacuation and treatment of the wounded.

In summary, the issue of command at special incidents, to include hostage situations, must be coordinated in advance. One of the overriding factors will be jurisdictional authority but potential problems such as limits to authority must be decided on and committed to writing by all parties prior to the event. A contact for initiation of planning is the civil defense/disaster/disturbance coordinator whose planning is geared to unusual events which require the coordination of multiple agencies.

A recent development in assisting the commander has been the utilization of the "Think Tank" (Cawley, 1974), "War Council" (Estelle, 1976) or "Brainstorming and Skull Sessions" (Department of the Army **Field Manual 22-100, Military Leadership,** 1973). According to the Army **Field Manual** this is:

> ... a good technique to use when there is difficulty in developing courses of action. Brainstorming is a creative technique which encourages several persons to suggest as many solutions to a problem as possible. The idea behind brainstorming is to allow each member of the group to give his suggestions without fear of criticism. Keep in mind that in these sessions, the emphasis is on quantity rather than on quality, especially since a 'far-out' solution may trigger a workable idea from someone else in the group (p. 10-3).

Cawley (1974) described the utilization of the "Think Tank" in a 1973 hostage incident:

> The 'Think Tank' was made up of top department officials and other key personnel. Outside experts including psychologists were called upon; ... Liaison was established with other governmental agencies for their assistance as might be required and with the FBI in the event the gunmen and hostages were to leave the jurisdiction. The 'Think Tank' was a tool for the field command. It provided behind-the-scene research and staff resources to aid in decision making at the scene. It developed possible strategies and attempted to anticipate every possible contingency (p. 33).

The idea behind this special advisory organization was explored by Chairman Richard N. Ichord's House Committee on Internal Security.

> ... the Chair has become especially interested in the establishment of regional study and action teams consisting of various disciplines, such as FBI officials, criminologists, psychiatrists, and media analysts which could be located at various points throughout the United States. When a kidnapping occurs or some important act of terrorism is committed, one or more of these teams would immediately move to the site of the crime and take charge of the investigation, conduct negotiations, take steps to protect the victim, and in general participate at the highest level of the operations (U.S. Congress, House, **Terrorism, Part 1,** 1974, p. 3004).

Witnesses before the Committee were almost universally in favor of such a team approach but differed on utilization techniques. Some favored the team to take charge of the situation; some favored the team to respond and advise only and some favored the use of the team to train regional department personnel. It can nevertheless be said that the team approach is acquiring widespread support.

Although command of hostage situations is extremely important, without adequate communications that command could not be exercised properly. This case was made at Attica in 1971 when "The authorities were slow in responding due largely to the absence of a riot control plan, the lack of available manpower and an antiquated communications system" (**Attica, The Official Report of the New York State Special Commission on Attica,** 1972, p. 109).

The current concept of communications in an emergency situation has been developed by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency in cooperation with twelve federal, state and independent agencies. The concept is the Emergency Operation Center (EOC). The principle of the EOC is to have a facility available which has adequate working space to accommodate representatives of the various agencies which may be called in to assist in an emergency. Here maps, displays and plans are stored for immediate reference in decision making. The EOC has:

> ... communications facilities and equipment adequate to permit key local executives to direct and control emergency operations. This includes equipment in or linked to the EOC permitting communications (1) with local operating forces (police, fire, public works, engineering) and (2) with hospitals, ambulance dispatch points, news media, shelters, other local EOC's and the State-Area or State EOC (Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, 1972, p. 15).

The specific EOC mentioned is obviously designed for civil defense/disaster/disturbance but the concept has been modified successfully by many police departments with their establishment of mobile command posts. Of course funds obtained through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the threat of rioting in the 1960's provided much of the impetus for adding this necessary but expensive equipment to the police inventory. With LEAA financial assistance being directed toward training and exemplary projects, funds for equipment are difficult to obtain. Neither is it easy to justify funds for an EOC which will be seldom used. With these limitations in mind, a skeleton EOC could be established by simply designating an area of sufficient size and installing such prerequisites as telephone drops, antenna

drops, map boards and desks, ec. The area could function as an office or a conference room until needed; then the control force and augmenting agencies could bring their own radios to use as net stations, install the telephone instruments and bring in any other equipment that is necessary. This would, of course, be time consuming but in this model for neutralizing hostage situations, the control force is playing for time. In this time the EOC could be built up as large as necessary or remain austere depending on the scope of the situation and the number of agencies responding to assist.

Miscellaneous Tasks

Many of the options open to the control force for coping with hostage situations will be limited by the availability of the proper equipment. There have been situations where such diverse equipment as building wreckers and scuba diving gear were needed. Since it is impossible to foresee the need of specific items of equipment and probably more impossible to justify funds for their purchase, the possibility of borrowing equipment should be considered.

> If equipment is to be borrowed, sources must be identified; agreements made; and notification, delivery, use, and return procedures determined in the planning stage and not left to the last minute. Excellent sources of information on emergency equipment, sources of supply and availability are the state/city planning commission, civil defense director, and the military director of the Emergency Operations Center (Needham, 1975, p. 37).

A continuing task throughout a hostage situation is the gathering, recording, interpretation and dissemination of information. The use of information as intelligence has already been discussed. This information has yet another important function. It will be used as the basis for prosecution of the hostage-taker. It is essential, therefore, to insure that this information is retained and catalogued correctly. Consideration should be given to having one individual responsible for this task. Maximum use should be made of tape recordings of telephone calls, radio transmissions and planted microphones. Video tape recordings and still photos of the area could also prove useful especially if zoom or telephoto lenses are available.

A third use of this information is to analyze the case and develop lessons learned and after-action reports. These can prove invaluable in revising strategies and as a source of information to other departments. Since the negotiation model is relatively new it awaits verification in the field.

This information should then be compiled into a resources manual which alphabetically lists the type of equipment with information on who to contact, day and night telephone numbers, equipment specifications, such as size, model, nomenclature, horsepower, etc., and rental costs if applicable. Naturally the manual has to be kept updated since sources change, responsible individuals change, etc. The task of compiling and updating such a manual is formidable but its worth is realized in an emergency. Not only does it allow for the expeditious acquiring of equipment but it may also spark a new tactical idea by the control force based on the availability of a specific piece of equipment.

REVIEW OF FIELD PRACTICES

The purpose of this chapter is to report the current practices in the fields of law enforcement and corrections in dealing with hostage situations. It is subdivided into a policy and experience section, a philosophy section, a negotiation section, a section on tactics and a summary.

To determine current field practices, concepts in the theories contained in the literature pertaining to hostage situations were operationalized and incorporated into a ten page, forty-eight item structured questionnaire. As a pre-test, the questionnaire was administered to the committee supervising this thesis and to selected graduate students whose law enforcement and corrections experience paralleled that found in the fields of law enforcement and corrections. After appropriate modifications were made the resulting eight page questionnaire (Appendix A) was sent to the police departments of the fifty largest cities in the United States and to the Department of Corrections of each of the fifty states. Table 1 summarizes the responses from these departments.

TABLE 1

Response to Questionnaire Administered to Fifty Police Departments and Fifty Corrections Departments

Department	Total Response					
	Completed Questionnaires Returned		Number and Per Cent that Overtly Declined to Participate or Claimed Questionnaire was Lost		No Response	
	Frequency	Per Cent	Frequency	Per Cent	Frequency	Per Cent
Police	25	50	4	8	21	42
Corrections	27	54	7	14	16	32
Total	52	52	11	11	37	37

This chapter will analyze those areas where there is an agreement between law enforcement and corrections and also those areas where there is a significant disagreement. Responses received can be found integrated into the questionnaire presented in Appendix A.

All percentages used in this chapter and Appendix A use the number of returned, completed questionnaires as the base number to compute the percentage. For instance, the statement that fifty-six per cent (56%) of police and seventy per cent (70%) of corrections favor a particular tactic means that of the number of police and corrections departments that returned the questionnaire, fifty-six and seventy per cent respectively favored that tactic.

Policy and Experience

In order to determine how many of the departments surveyed had experience in dealing with hostage situations, Question Number Six asked if the department had handled any hostage situations in the last five years (1972-1976). Seventy-six per cent (76%) of the police departments and seventy per cent (70%) of the corrections departments surveyed indicated that they had handled hostage situations in the last five years. This finding lends credibility to the contention that the remaining responses would be the result of not only theory but also of actual experience.

Question Number Six also asked for an evaluation of the departments' handling of the situation by sending after-action-reports, critiques, lessons learned or newspaper clippings. These documents were solicited in order to evaluate the departments' policies and procedures against their success in accomplishing the mission. Only a handful of the returned questionnaires contained any such documents. Furthermore, the majority of the documents received were incomplete summaries of the incidents. Many of the police incidents were joint operations with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and reflected the policies and procedures of the FBI more than the police departments involved. For these reasons, an evaluation of the appropriateness of policies and procedures could not be accomplished with any degree of validity.

It was found, by responses to Question Number One, that over half of the departments surveyed had formal policies and procedures covering hostage situations—fifty-six per cent (56%) of police departments and fifty-two per cent (52%) of corrections departments indicated that they had formal policies and procedures. An additional twenty-four per cent (24%) of police departments and forty-four per cent (44%) of corrections departments had informal, uncodified policies and procedures. Only four per cent (4%) of corrections departments and twenty-four per cent (24%) of police departments claimed no policies and procedures either formal or informal. This latter difference is probably explained by the fact that most corrections departments are governed by state law which prohibits either the escape of the hostage-taker or the granting of amnesty or both. These state laws are considered to be policies and procedures.

Question Number One also solicited a copy of the policies and procedures if they were in writing. In response to this request it was found that, generally speaking, the corrections departments' policies were short statements to guide response rather than documents containing specific tasks and techniques. A typical corrections policy stated:

> In the event any officers or employees have been seized as hostages, no officer or employee on duty shall disregard, alter, modify or change in any manner the prescribed duties, obligations, or responsibilities of his position on demand by the prisoners, or pleas from the hostages, regardless of the consequences (Source withheld to protect confidentiality).

In contrast, the police plans received were from fifteen to twenty-five pages in length and contained detailed in-

structions for all members of the control force who either responded to the situation or supported the operation. Although the number of written policies and procedures was small, the fact that each one received fell into the pattern described above may indicate that this trend can be generalized.

This generalization is also supported by the responses to Question Number Five. This question asked if the department felt that elaborate planning for hostage situations was justified based on past incidences, future trends, and sensitivity of the situation. While three quarters (76%) of police departments felt that elaborate planning was justified, only half (48%) of corrections departments felt such planning justified. The other half (48%) of corrections departments felt it was not justified as opposed to only eight per cent (8%) or two of the police departments taking the same stand.

Responses to the remaining three questions of Part One of the questionnaire revealed no significant difference between corrections and police departments. These responses are summarized in Table 2.

TABLE 2

Responses to Questions Two, Three and Four of the Questionnaire

Question	Response in %					
	Yes		No		Unknown	
	P*	C**	P*	C**	P*	C**
2. Are there any political or supervisory policies that limit your range of options in dealing with hostage situations?	28	20	72	74	4	4
3. Is higher authority receptive to active participation, if needed, in a hostage situation as opposed to viewing the situation solely as your department's problem?	56	89	32	4	12	4
4. Do policies and procedures include coordination with other criminal justice agencies—state, local, and federal?	72	81	20	15	0	0
If answer to the above question is yes, are other agencies cooperative?	64	81	0	0	0	0

*P = Police
**C = Corrections Department

Source: Response to Questions Number Two, Three and Four of Questionnaire

Question Number Two also asked for the specific political or supervisory policies that limit the range of options. One response each was received from five different police departments. The restrictions listed were those imposed by their deadly force regulation, that the life of the hostage is most important, that no movement of the hostage-taker is allowed, that no replacement hostages are allowed and that no firearms are supplied to the hostage-taker. One response each was received from four different corrections departments. The restrictions were that no amnesty or negotiation is allowed, no release of the hostage-taker is allowed and that state law prohibited allowing escape of the hostage-taker.

Philosophy

Nineteen questions (Questions Number Seven through Twenty-five) were devoted to obtaining departmental philosophy in coping with hostage situations. Although these questions were worded as opinion questions, the high experience rate of the respondees indicated that experience as well as opinion was reflected in the responses.

The first question (Question Number Seven) was intended to test the assumption that hostage situations faced by police are similar to hostage situations faced by corrections officials. A majority of police (52%) and a minority of corrections (41%) felt that the situations faced by each were similar. The differences most referred to are listed in Table 3.

In response to Question Number Eight, most of the respondents (85%) felt that the safety of the hostages was the most important mission of the control force in dealing with hostage situations. Police felt more strongly (92%) on this issue than did corrections (78%). Preventing the escape of the hostage-taker and neutralizing the situation in the quickest possible time were selected by sixty-four per cent of the respondents as being the next two most important missions. On the latter issue, seventy-eight per cent (78%) of corrections and forty-eight per cent (48%) of police felt solving the situation quickly was an important issue. The fourth most popular response (62%) was minimizing casualties. The fifth mission of apprehension of the hostage-taker was selected by fifty-six per cent (56%) of the respondents.

TABLE 3

Salient Differences in Hostage Situations Faced by Police and by Corrections

Police Responses in %		Corrections Responses in %	
Responding	Salient Difference	Responding	Salient Difference
12	Prisons deal with groups while police deal with single felons.	15	Prisoners are already isolated while police must effect isolation.
8	Prison situations are planned while police situations are spontaneous.	15	Prisoners are already known while police must establish identity.
8	Prisons deal in a known location while police must deal anywhere.	7	Prisoners are more unified than hostage-takers facing police.
8	Background information is known in prisons but not to police.	7	Prison situations are better planned than in free world.

Source: Response to Question Number Seven of Questionnaire.

The highest selection rate for commander of the control force in a hostage situation (Question Number Nine) was for the normal supervisor in the chain of command (49%). The second highest (26%) was designated by corrections as the warden or supervisor. Only two percent (2%) felt that the negotiator should assume command. By opting

for the warden but not for the negotiator, it is not clear if corrections is implying that negotiation should not be used as a tactic or that the negotiator should be in an actual position of authority. Table 4 outlines the options considered appropriate to deal with hostage situations.

It is interesting to note that while most police response (88%) listed negotiations and containment, most corrections responses (89%) listed assault and gas. This may indicate that police are more likely to use restraint while corrections are more likely to use force. Nevertheless, negotiations was listed more frequently by both police and corrections as the favored control force tactic.

The response from Question Number Ten revealed that both police and corrections felt overwhelmingly (88%) that no option should be considered standard procedure but options should be evaluated in accordance with the situation. The minority (10%) which felt that an option should be considered standard procedure listed negotiation and containment. Both police and corrections minority opinion was in concurrence.

TABLE 4

Control Force Options in a Hostage Situation

Option	Responses in %		
	Police	Corrections	Total
Negotiations	88	85	87
Assault	76	89	83
Gas	72	89	81
Fire by Selected Marksmen	80	74	77
Containment (waiting the situation out)	88	63	75
Cutting off Utilities	64	63	63
Denial of Food and Water	60	63	62
Less Lethal Weapons such as stun gun, taser, etc.	36	67	52
Full Firepower	52	41	46
Drugged Food	44	37	40
Use of Police Type Dogs	32	37	35

Source: Responses to Question Number Ten of Questionnaire.

Most (67%) departments, in responding to Question Number Twelve, felt that task forces composed of criminologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, news media analysts, political analysts and military tactics advisors were not needed to respond to hostage situations. If such a task force were formed (Question Number Thirteen) these departments felt that it should be organized at departmental level (13%), city/municipal level (10%), or state level (10%). Only two per cent (2%) favored its formation at federal level. If such a task force were formed and committed to action in a hostage situation (Question Number Fourteen), forty-two per cent (42%) of the departments outlined its function as giving advice to the existing commander, while thirty-seven per cent (37%) saw the function as training departmental personnel prior to hostage situations. The latter training mission was favored by sixty per cent (60%) of police departments but only fifteen per cent (15%) of corrections departments. Not one responding department favored such a team to take over command of a hostage situation. This may be indicative of the closed door policy which the prison has enjoyed since the establishment of prisons in the United States.

Question Number Fifteen provided a wide divergence of opinion between corrections and police. The question was designed to uncover the underlying reasons behind a department's adoption or rejection of a policy of negotiation. The question was "Adoption of a policy of negotiation could result in which of the following: (Make one or more choices)." The results are given in Table 5.

It can be seen from Table 5 that while police believe that negotiation is a tool to be used for the early release of the hostages, corrections believes that negotiations will promote hostage-taking in the future. It can be argued that police and corrections beliefs represent two different universes and that a policy which has a deterrent effect on one universe does not have the same effect on the other. Indeed the responses to Question Number Seven indicate that fifty-two per cent (52%) of the respondees did not feel that prison and free world hostage situations were similar. The differences given, however, did not include reference to a differing level of deterrent effect of the policies applied in each.

Nevertheless the responses to Question Number Fifteen indicated that there are differing beliefs held by law enforcement and corrections personnel which affect their outlook on the use of negotiations. Since police believe that negotiations will promote early release of the hostages and has no effect on hostage-taking in the future, they are more disposed to use this technique. Since corrections personnel seem to believe that negotiations promote hostage-taking in the future and lends credibility to the hostage-taker's actions, they are less likely to use this technique. Only the belief that negotiations promotes early release of the hostages addresses itself to the avowed primary mission of the control force, that is, the safety of the hostages (Question Number Eight).

TABLE 5

Perceived Results of Adoption of a Policy of Negotiation

Results	Responses in %		
	Police	Corrections	Total
Promote early release of the hostages after negotiations have begun	76	33	54
Promote hostage-taking in the future	12	52	33
Lend credibility to the hostage-taker's actions	4	44	25
Has no effect on hostage-taking in the future	40	4	21
Lessen hostage-taking in the future	24	11	17

Source: Responses to Question Number Fifteen of Questionnaire.

Nonnegotiable demands are addressed in Question Number Sixteen. Table 6 contains the results from this question. Generally, the responses to this question reveal that police are likely to leave more demands open to negotiation than corrections although firearms and other weapons are considered nonnegotiable by both police and corrections. This is not surprising in light of the fact that

police are more disposed to utilize negotiation than are corrections.

The optimum location for conducting negotiations was explored in Question Number Seventeen. The highest response (37%) indicated that negotiations should be conducted from each other's locations using telephone, radio, public address system, notes, etc. to communicate. While forty-eight (48%) per cent of police departments favored this technique, only twenty-six per cent (26%) of corrections departments also favored it. Corrections felt (44%) that neutral ground was the best location. Only sixteen per cent (16%) of police departments favored this location. The difference in opinion most likely reflects the experience of the two types of departments since most police must respond to a street location while corrections officials are usually in control of most of the institution and have the hostage-takers isolated in a small part of it. The significant finding in this question was that both types of departments did not favor negotiations on the hostage-taker's home ground. Only twelve per cent (12%) favored this location with police (16%) being more likely to use this location than corrections (7%).

TABLE 6

Nonnegotiable Items

Nonnegotiable Item	Responses in %		
	Police	Corrections	Total
Firearms or other weapons	92	78	85
Amnesty for hostage-taker	48	70	60
Drugs	44	70	58
Freedom for hostage-taker	36	74	56
Alcohol	36	67	52
Transportation away from hostage situation site	32	67	50
Monetary ransom	20	59	40
Replacement hostages	48	26	37
Access to news media	8	22	15
No items should be nonnegotiable	8	7	8
Food and drink	4	7	6

Source: Responses to Question Number Sixteen of Questionnaire.

In Chapter II it was pointed out that most police departments deal with hostage-takers in the situational context, that is, making no assumptions about the situation but basing their actions on evaluated intelligence. Assumptions, however, are necessary in the planning stage.

> Assumptions are an essential part of forecasting and are used in all stages of the planning sequence. In the absence of facts, assumptions state conditions that must exist if a specific plan is to be put into effect (Department of the Army **Field Manual 101-5, Staff Officers Field Manual, Staff Organization and Procedure,** 1972, pp. 6-2).

To determine which, if any, assumptions could be made for hostage situations, Question Number Eighteen asked, "Do you consider any of the following assumptions to be valid ones on which to base control force strategy? (More than one response may be necessary)." Table 7 contains the responses to this question.

TABLE 7

Assumptions in Planning for Hostage Situations

Assumptions*	Responses in %		
	Police	Corrections	Total
A hostage-taker's initial demands may not be what finally motivates him to surrender.	72	70	71
Time is on the side of the control force.	88	41	63
Hostages are less likely to be injured with time.	84	30	56
Unarmed hostage-takers should be subdued without use of lethal force before they can get organized.	40	59	50
The hostages may find a way to escape with time.	76	22	48
If the hostage-taker kills, negotiations are useless.	48	48	48
Immediate concessions hinder negotiations.	32	41	37
Hostages are more likely to be injured with time.	12	37	25
Hostages who are moved are more likely to be injured.	28	22	25
All hostage-takers want to escape.	24	15	19
If the hostage-taker kills, negotiations are still the best tactic.	24	7	15
Hostage-takers must be mentally disturbed.	12	15	13

*The assumptions in this table have been paraphrased. See Question Number Eighteen of the questionnaire for original wording.

Source: Responses to Question Number Eighteen of questionnaire.

Of particular interest is the wide difference of opinion between police and corrections regarding the effects of the passage of time in a hostage situation. While police view the passage of time to be a factor in their favor, i. e., hostages are less likely to be injured or killed or may escape, corrections personnel downgrade the effect of time on the situation. They may even view the passage of time to be to their detriment. More corrections departments feel that the hostage is more likely to be injured with the passage of time (37%) than less likely to be injured (30%).

The role of the news media in hostage situations found a concurrence of opinion between police and corrections. In response to Question Number Nineteen, seventy-three per cent (73%) of responding departments felt that media coverage of hostage situations encourages future hostage situations. They also felt, in response to Question Number Twenty, that if the media were allowed to sit in and cover negotiations the possibility of a negotiated settlement would be decreased (48%). The police were less sure (32%) than corrections (63%) on this matter. One-third or thirty-two per cent (32%) of police departments responding did not have an opinion on this question. Most departments (58%) agreed that the news media should be included when planning for hostage situations so as to coordinate selective release or temporary suppression of information concerning hostage situations (Question Number Twenty-One). While most departments (54%) reported that the news media would cooperate with them during sensitive situations like hostage situations by honoring some but not all of their requests (Question Number Twenty-Two), a surprising number (40%) indicated unqualified cooperation. Only six per cent (6%) indicated that they did not receive cooperation from the news media.

Both the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives are exploring legislative deterrents to hostage and terroristic situations (U. S. Congress, Senate, **Terroristic Activity, Parts 1-5,** 1974, and U. S. Congress, House, **Terrorism, Parts 1-4,** 1974). The major legislative proposals were extracted from these hearings and administered to corrections and police in Question Number Twenty-Three. Table 8 contains the responses.

Table 8 indicates that generally police and corrections do not see the answer to hostage situations evolving from legislation although corrections is slightly more apt to favor legislative action.

There is a feeling in the field that more research is needed in the development of "hardware" (Question Number Twenty-Four) and "software" (Question Number Twenty-Five) for dealing with hostage situations. Seventy-five per cent (75%) saw a need for more "software" development, that is, development of a better understanding of human motivation and behavior. Fifty-eight per cent (58%) felt there was a need for more "hardware" or equipment to assist in dealing with these situations. The piece of "hardware" most mentioned (40%) was an incapacitating gas or drug. This item would have to be nonlethal, stable, easy to administer and undetectable.

TABLE 8

Deterrents to Hostage-Taking

Deterrent	Responses in %		
	Police	Corrections	Total
Assure speedy apprehension, trial and punishment	76	78	77
Prohibit the granting of amnesty	44	59	52
Prohibit the payment of ransom	28	48	38
Make capital punishment **mandatory**	20	22	21
Make capital punishment **optional**	4	15	10
Unknown	12	7	10

Source: Responses to Question Number Twenty-Three of Questionnaire.

Negotiation

Four questions (Numbers Twenty-Six through Twenty-Nine) were included in Part III of the questionnaire to verify the negotiator traits, training and utilization techniques found in the literature. One question (Number Thirty) was designed to inquire into the relative effectiveness of negotiators based on sex and race. Question Twenty-Six asked which traits were most important for hostage negotiators. Table 9 contains all traits receiving a fifty per cent (50%) or greater response rate.

The third trait in Table 9, integrity/credibility, received the lowest response from police (60%) but the highest response (85%) from corrections. To explain this difference, Table 10 lists the other traits that police and corrections disagree on.

TABLE 9

Hostage Negotiator Traits

Traits	Responses in %		
	Police	Corrections	Total
Ability to think clearly under stress	92	81	87
Emotional maturity	84	78	81
Good listener	84	67	75
Integrity/credibility	60	85	73
Ability to persuade	80	63	71
Verbal ability	80	52	65
Ability to avoid emotional involvement	64	63	63
General practical intelligence	64	59	62
Ability to cope with uncertainty	68	56	62
Commitment to negotiation program	64	37	50

Source: Responses to Question Number Twenty-Six of Questionnaire.

TABLE 10

Hostage Negotiator Traits on Which Police and Corrections Disagree

Traits	Responses in %		
	Police	Corrections	Total
Experience in department	28	52	40
Must be in actual position of authority	8	56	33
Volunteer	48	15	31
Authoritative physical appearance	8	37	23

Source: Responses to Question Number Twenty-Six of Questionnaire.

From these responses it is evident that corrections sees the negotiation task as an additional task for the person already in authority. Police, on the other hand, view hostage negotiation as a specialty.

The areas the respondents felt a hostage negotiator should be trained in were psychology (81%) and role playing or stress training (69%). No other area on Question Number Twenty-Seven received more than a thirty-three per cent (33%) response.

When asked if more than one negotiator should respond to a hostage incident (Question Number Twenty-Eight), most replied "Yes." The reasons given were to protect against fatigue of the primary negotiator (44%), to allow for one to talk while one planned strategy (40%) and to monitor the primary negotiator's mood (40%). Only four per cent (4%) of police but forty-one per cent (41%) of corrections felt that more than one negotiator should respond.

Question Number Twenty-Nine probed the amount of authority a hostage negotiator should have. Most respondents (56%) indicated that the negotiator should be a semi-authoritative figure who can make limited decisions and concessions. While this result is consistent with police philosophy, it runs against corrections philosophy which favors an authoritative figure as a negotiator.

The last question in this part of the questionnaire (Number Thirty) attempted to determine selection of a negotiator based on race and sex if all other factors were equal. About fifty per cent (50%) of the responses favored matching the race and sex of the negotiator with that of a male hostage-taker. When the hostage-taker was female, only thirty-three per cent (33%) favored matching by race and sex. Possibly the most significant result of this question is that thirty-three per cent (33%) of the respondents stated that they could not answer it and another eight per cent (8%) (all corrections) thought the question was irrelevant. It can be concluded that field experience has not extended to the relative impact of race and sex on negotiations if, in fact, these variables have any impact.

Tactics

Part Four of the questionnaire regarding tactics received a higher degree of concurrence than any other part on the questionnaire. Part Four consisted of one question (Number Thirty-One) divided into three phases. The question was, "Assuming a hostage situation of a major significance, which of the following actions should be taken?" The responses are given in Table 11.

The high concurrence rate between corrections and police tends to verify the tactics contained in the literature. The lower concurrence rate in the movement phase is probably explained by the fact that most states withdraw authority from the prison to allow an inmate to escape.

Summary

The responses from the field indicated that most of the departments had experienced a hostage situation in the last five years. While police were likely to respond to these situations with detailed plans, corrections were likely to respond with general policy statements. Most respondents did not feel that prison and free world hostage situations were similar, but both groups saw the safety of the hostages as the most important control force mission. This mission should be carried out by the normal supervisor in the chain of command. In carrying out the mission, police are more likely to use restraint and corrections are more likely to use force, although each type of department would select a tactic based on the situation at hand. These differing philosophies seem to stem from the police belief that negotiations promote early release of the hostages and have no effect on hostage-taking in the future as opposed to corrections' belief that negotiations promote hostage-taking in the future and lends credibility to the hostage-takers' actions.

Since police are more disposed to negotiations, they are likely to leave more items open for negotiation than are corrections. If negotiations were to be entered, both types of departments favored the location to be from neutral ground or from each other's home ground using telephone, etc., to communicate.

TABLE 11

Control Force Tactics in a Hostage Situation

Tactics	Responses in %		
	Police	Corrections	Total
Response Phase			
Isolate the area	100	89	94
Establish mobilization point/command post	92	74	83
Evacuate unaffected building occupants	84	78	81
Roster reinforcements, assign missions and establish communications	80	70	75
Establish inner and outer perimeter	84	67	75
Call for ambulance and medical support	84	67	75
Call for hostage negotiator	88	56	71
Call for reinforcements	72	67	69
Establish crowd control	84	56	69
Maintain firepower control	84	56	69
Call for SWAT or special tactical unit	88	48	67
Consolidation Phase			
Establish identity of hostage-taker and hostages	88	89	88
Establish communications with hostage-taker	92	81	87
Question building occupants and escaped or released hostages	84	81	83
Obtain building floor plans	88	70	79
Question acquaintances of hostage-taker and hostages	84	74	79
Develop assault plan	76	78	77
Position selected marksmen and gas grenadiers	72	70	71
Establish "Think Tank"	64	70	67
Determine logistics requirements and sources	72	63	67
Establish control force rotation plan	68	48	58
Rehearse assault plan	56	41	48
Movement Phase			
Select movement route	80	41	60
Secure new location	76	33	54
Select appropriate transportation for hostage-taker and hostages	76	33	54
Clear and secure movement route	84	41	62
Notify responsible jurisdiction(s) at new site and along movement route	72	33	52
Secure original location (crime scene) after move	72	33	52
Arrange for air surveillance	72	26	48
Consolidate new location after move	64	33	48
We would not allow movement	20	56	38

Source: Responses to Question Number Thirty-One of Questionnaire.

Neither type of department was in favor of formation of a task force of behavioral scientists, and tactics, political and news media analysts. If one was formed, they favor local control over it and would use it in an advisory and training capacity.

In planning for hostage situations, police consider the passage of time as being in their favor. Corrections does not recognize time to be a factor in their favor and feel it may even work against them.

Both types of departments were in concurrence as far as the news media was concerned. They agreed that the media could have a detrimental effect on negotiations and must be managed and planned for.

Corrections were more disposed to favor legislative deterrents to hostage-taking than the police. Both types of departments, however, feel more research is needed into understanding human motivation and behavior. Research into developing an incapacitating gas or drug was also seen as a research need.

While police see the hostage negotiator as a specialist and may even use a team of negotiators for an incident, corrections see the negotiation task as an additional duty

of the authority figure. Both types of departments agree that the negotiator should be a semi-authoritative figure. The role of race and sex in negotiation was not resolved.

There was a high degree of concurrence in, what has become, the standard tactics in dealing with hostage situations. As an exception, most corrections officials are prohibited from allowing the hostage-taker to move outside the confines of the prison.

GENERALIZATIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings of the review of the literature and the review of field practices to prison hostage situations. The tactics and techniques discussed in the previous two chapters are analyzed to determine their general applicability to prison situations. This chapter is based on the assumption that although each hostage situation is unique unto itself, the modification of certain tactics and techniques, according to the situation, will enhance the chances of a successful outcome. These tactics and techniques will not have equal weight in each situation in which they are applied. This model forms a framework or a starting point on which to build. Intelligent application of these principles and analysis of the consideration presented here together with the dynamics of each individual situation are necessary to enhance the successful outcome. This chapter is divided into sections on the mission, planning, sequence of events, suggestions for further study and summary.

Mission

The pivotal concept in dealing with hostage situations is the adoption of a measurable mission for the control force. The term "success," used throughout the literature, is vague in that it allows for differing interpretations. A review of the literature, however, reveals that current thought places the lives of the hostages as the paramount consideration. This is supported by the questionnaire responses from law enforcement and corrections. It is doubtful that, since much of the literature omits the question of the safety of the control force and bystanders, it implies that these are not equally important missions. The implication is that safety in general, and the hostages' safety in particular, is the most important measurable mission of the control force.

Law enforcement and corrections practitioners feel that concurrent missions to safety are preventing the escape of the the hostage-taker, minimizing casualties and apprehension of the hostage-taker. These missions can realistically be restated as insuring the safety of all concerned and control of the hostage-taker. Both missions are measurable relative to goal attainment. If none of the hostages, control force, or bystanders are injured and the hostage-taker's freedom of movement is governed by the control force, the mission is successful. The mission of neutralizing the situation in the quickest possible time is omitted as a control force mission, since the literature and law enforcement both downgrade its importance and see the desire for a quick solution as detrimental to accomplishing the other primary missions. Only corrections sees quick neutralization as one of its missions. In order to accomplish the other missions, however, the time factor must be sacrificed.

To adopt a dual mission in hostage situations can confuse the control force policy, especially when the missions may conflict with each other. As the United States Army principles of war state:

> Objective. Every military operation must be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. ...Each intermediate objective must be such that its attainment will most directly, quickly and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. ... Every commander must understand and clearly define his objective and consider each contemplated action in light thereof (Matloff, 1969, p. 6).

It is therefore necessary to assign relative priorities to the dual mission in hostage situations. The literature and field practices make it clear that the principle mission is the safety of all concerned, including the hostage-taker, and the secondary mission is the control of the hostage-taker. This model is designed to accomplish the dual mission in their relative priorities.

In order to generalize between hostage situations faced by police and hostage situations faced by corrections, it is necessary to determine if the situations faced by each are similar. Responses from the field reveal that a minority of departments see the situations are similar. Some of the salient differences given by field departments are that inmate hostage-takers are already known and background information is available on them and that the corrections officials deal on known turf where the hostage-takers are already isolated. These differences work in favor of corrections officials since police must gather this information and affect isolation on strange ground when it is not in a police administered jail.

A fourth difference given is that prison situations are better planned by the hostage-takers and the inmates are more unified. The literature negates the contention that hostage situations which evolve from riots are planned. It has been pointed out (MacCormick, 1954; Fox, 1972; Garson, 1972, and Desroches, 1974) that prison riots involved little or no planning and that hostage-taking is incidental to the riot itself. Furthermore a large percentage of inmates do not participate at all and a large percentage of those who do participate, wish the institution's return to normalcy. Hostage situations arising from attempted escapes, on the other hand, exhibit a higher degree of planning and unification, and may be comparable to terrorist incidents faced by police.

Another difference given which obtained a significant response was that corrections more often deal with groups of hostage-takers while police are likely to deal with single hostage-takers. The literature supports this contention. It is also suggested (Desroches, 1974) that in hostage situations which started as riots or evolved out of a riot, an inmate leadership forms which is often not the same leadership that developed in the riot. In an escape attempt, there is invariably a designated leader because of the planning that appears to be essential in such an attempt. In either case, corrections deals with a central contact much the same as police do. The significant dif-

ference, when dealing with lone hostage-takers is that the hostage-taker does not receive support from co-conspirators. When dealing with groups of hostage-takers, the leader is probably sensitive to his appearance to his peers. This is likely to make him more difficult to deal with.

From a review of the questionnaire responses and the literature, it appears that there are more similarities in hostage situations faced by police and corrections than differences. In addition, the differences that have been noted are ones which make hostage situations faced by corrections easier to control but more difficult to negotiate. The author feels that sufficient similarity exists between situations faced by each type of department to allow generalization from law enforcement to corrections.

Planning

If the first step in developing a model for coping with hostage situations is an operational definition of the mission, the second step is the preparation of a plan to implement that mission. As Culley (1974) points out, "Luck is the residue of careful planning and proper preparation" (p. 12). The military is also a strong advocate of planning.

> Adequate and practical planning is essential to the success of any military undertaking. Proper planning permits the detailed and systematic examination of all factors involved in a projected operation (Department of the Army **Field Manual 101-5, Staff Officers Field Manual, Staff Organization and Procedure**, 1972, p. 6-1).

Army **Field Manual 101-5** further defines the characteristics of a plan:

> A good plan—
>
> a. Provides for accomplishing the mission, which is the objective of all planning.
>
> b. Is based on facts and valid assumptions. All pertinent data have been considered for their accuracy, and assumptions have been reduced to a minimum.
>
> c. Provides for the use of existing resources. These included resources organic to the organization and those available from higher headquarters.
>
> d. Provides for the necessary organization. It clearly establishes relationships and fixes responsibilites.
>
> e. Provides for continuity, i.e., the organization, personnel, material, and arrangements for the full period of the contemplated operation.
>
> f. Provides for decentralization. It delegates authority to the maximum extent consistent with the necessary control.
>
> g. Provides for direct contact, permitting coordination during execution between coequals and counterparts at all levels.
>
> h. Is simple. It reduces all essential elements to their simplest form and eliminates those elements not essential to successful action. A good plan also eliminates all possibilities for misunderstanding.
>
> i. Is flexible. It leaves room for adjustments because of operating conditions, and, where necessary, stipulates alternate courses of actions.
>
> j. Provides for control. Adequate means exist, or have been provided, to carry out the plan in accordance with the commanders' intent.
>
> k. Is coordinated. All elements fit together, control measures are complete and understandable, and mutual support requirements are identified and provided for (Department of the Army **Field Manual 101-5, Staff Officers Field Manual, Staff Organization and Procedure**, 1972, pp. 6-5, 6-6).

The policies and procedures received from police departments responding to this study met most of the above requirements, whereas those received from corrections met only a few. The reason corrections have not displayed an interest in planning for hostage situations may be summed up in a response to an item on the questionnaire which asked for the salient differences between prison and free world hostage situations. The response was that prisons are less affected by societal reaction. This seems to be true even after the criticism generated by the Attica uprising in 1971. The international impetus for police planning seems to have been the aftermath of the "Munich Massacre" of 1972. Then, according to New York City Police Department Detective Harvey Schlossberg, Ph.D., "I took things [psychological references] that were sitting on the shelves collecting dust. Nobody had applied them before to practical situations" (Balton, 1975-76, p. 1).

The New York Police Department is generally given credit for applying crisis intervention tactics in hostage situations. Of our forty thousand police agencies in the United States, one hundred and fifty have expressed interest in the New York program and fifteen have sent representatives to attend the training course (Whittemore, 1976). Similar motivation for corrections seems to be lacking.

The plan provides for the accomplishment of the mission and is based on facts and valid assumptions. Facts include the size of the control force that can be mustered, the number and types of outside agencies that can be counted on to assist, available equipment and maps of the buildings within the insitution. Assumptions which a majority of the questionnaire respondents felt were valid are:

1. A hostage-taker's initial demands may not be what finally motivates him to surrender.
2. The passage of time is on the side of the control force.
3. Hostages are less likely to be injured with the passage of time.
4. Unarmed hostage-takers should be subdued without the use of lethal force before they can get organized.

A fifth assumption which was favored by police but not corrections was that the hostages may find a way to escape

with time. Because the accounts of hostages escaping are prevalent in the literature, this should be included in the assumptions governing the plan.

A plan provides for the use of resources. A separate annex of the plan should contain the department's resource manual. This manual describes resources and services available with their location, responsible individual and notification procedures.

A plan provides for the necessary organization clearly establishing relationships. Perhaps the clearest method of providing the necessary organization is the preparation of an organizational chart. A type of organizatinal chart is shown in Figure I. No one organizational chart could conceivably apply to every prison. Appropriate modifications to this chart would probably have to be made depending upon the existing organization and the number and type of supporting agencies as well as the particular terms used by each organization to operationalize its structure and functioning.

The advantage of adopting the type of organization depicted in Figure I is that it reduces the commander's span of control to three elements during a high tension situation. It further insulates him from the emotional impact of dealing directly with the hostage-taker, news media and families of the hostages.

The plan must also clearly delegate authority and fix responsibilities to the maximum extent consistent with necessary control. Authority is delegated and responsibilities are fixed by writing job descriptions for each position. For instance, the job description for the Assistant Commander may provide for the assuming of responsibility and authority of the commander in the daily operation of the prison. Delegation of authority and responsibility should exclude specific actions such as commencement of new construction, changes in treatment programs, terminating certain industries, etc. These high level decisions should remain the responsibility of the commander. The assistant commander, in conjuction with the staff coordinator, should have the authority and responsibility to work out problems associated with the hostage situation such as developing alternate feeding arrangements for the unaffected prison population, notification of families if visitation is temporarily suspended and a myriad of problems associated with the hostage situation and everyday operation of the prison. These problems could be handled by subordinates thereby freeing the commander to devote his full energy to neutralizing the hostage situation.

Because each situation will be unique, the job description will have to be worded in a general manner. For

FIGURE I

Prison Organizational Chart for Hostage Situations



instance, the job description of the hostage negotiator would include the following tasks:

1. Establish communications with the hostage-taker. Face-to-face communications will be used as a last resort, and only with the approval of the commander after reasonable assurance is obtained that the negotiator will not become a hostage.

2. Attempt to reduce the anxiety of the hostage-taker by assurances that the mission is to assist in solving the problem at hand.

3. Attempt to establish rapport with the hostage-taker. Be honest with him in all conversations but do not release information that would be detrimental to the mission of the control force. Do not attempt to end the situation by force or trickery at the onset or during the negotiations until after becoming thoroughly familiar with the hostage-taker and the area and only if the hostage-taker makes a mistake significant enough to ensure the tactic will be successful. Do not underestimate the hostage-taker. When there is a lack of information, do nothing. There must be assurance that the tactic will be successful for it not, it may damage any rapport built up and may cause injury or death.

4. Establish the identity of the hostage-taker and the hostages. If there is a group of hostage-takers, establish which one has assumed leadership.

5. Ascertain the demands of the hostage-taker. Attempt to determine if the hostage-taker will settle for lesser demands. Make no concessions on the demands except when they have no direct effect on the status quo. Convince the hostage-taker that concessions on grave demands can only be made by higher authority.

6. Gather intelligence. Do not pressure the hostage-taker into answering questions but be alert to all information received to include nuances, changes in voice inflection, attitude of subordinate hostage-takers, etc. Do not omit reporting any detail, no matter how seemingly trivial. Tape record all conversations over electronic communications and reduce to writing expeditiously any conversations held face-to-face.

7. Constructively stall for time. When other tactics have failed, indicate that the situation, demands, etc. must be discussed with prison authorities.

8. Attempt to determine if transference has built up between the hostages and hostage-takers.

A good plan also provides for continuity, i.e., the organization, personnel, material and arrangements for the full period of the contemplated operation. The organization chart provides for a continuity of command for the major divisions of the prison. This same concept must be followed in designating individuals throughout the organization to assume command in the absence of their designated commander or supervisor. This must be accomplished for several levels of command to preclude the possibility of the top two supervisors being absent when an emergency action needs a decision. Emergencies may come up night or day and the commander or assistant commander may be away or sleeping or the second in command may be called away from the operation by a personal emergency and a decision is called for when the commander is unavailable. Numerous situations may occur in a hostage situation which in the planning stage seem remote. The best way to insure continuity of command is to designate, in the planning stage, the chain of command from the highest to the lowest level of authority.

Making arrangements to insure continuity of personnel and material for the full duration of the operation presents special problems since the exact duration of the operation is not known. The most common method of insuring continuity of personnel is the indefinite cancellation of leaves or vacations and the recall of personnel who are already in this status. Planning for continuity should be done assuming a thirty-day operation. This is not because every operation will last thirty days but that in assuming a thirty-day period, the planners are forced to include considerations which only apply once a month. For instance, if the institution normally receives a shipment of prisoners from a particular county jail once a month, stop shipment orders should be considered to prevent introduction of additional prisoners into an already taxed institution.

Financial planning is also required if the institution must pay overtime wages. Funding may also be required for the rental of selected pieces of equipment. Planning should be conducted to utilize the already existing emergency contingency fund or the establishment of such a fund by including it in the next budget request.

The plan should also provide for direct contact, permitting coordination during execution between coequals and counterparts at all levels. This does not usurp the prerogatives of the commander but enhances cooperation. It also serves to provide the commander with feedback on possible difficulties realized at the execution level which were not apparent at the planning and supervisory level.

Flexibility is important in planning. The planners should leave room for adjustments because of operating conditions and should stipulate alternate courses of action. The alternate courses of action selected by the questionnaire respondents are listed below in increasing order of severity. The percentage that follows the option indicates the number of departments favoring it:

1. Containment (waiting the situation out)	75%
2. Negotiation	87%
3. Cutting off utilities	63%
4. Denial of food and water	62%
5. Drugged food	40%
6. Less lethal weapons	52%
7. Use of police type dogs	35%
8. Gas	81%
9. Fire by selected marksmen	77%
10. Assault	84%
11. Full firepower	46%

These available options can be used with one another. For instance, containment and negotiation would normally be used together as would gas and assault. Normally the selection of a less severe course leaves the control force

with the option of later escalating to a more severe option. The converse is not true. Selection of a more severe course of action normally precludes the later selection of a less severe course of action. If the hostage-taker can survive a severe force option, chances are that he can survive a less severe option. Credibility is also difficult to build if the control force switches from force to negotiation.

The plan must also provide for control, that is the provision of adequate means to carry out the operation. Control is obtained by establishing an Emergency Operation Center (EOC). The EOC is a predesignated large office or conference room that has been prepared with radio antenna and telephone drops, desks, maps and auxiliary equipment unique to the department. This area is also the repository for the hostage plan. When the plan is put into effect, liaison representatives from responding agencies report to the EOC with their communications equipment. They are briefed on the plan by the staff coordinator and open communications nets with their respective agencies. The liaison representatives remain at the EOC under the control of the staff coordinator until the operation is concluded. Control and coordination are thereby enhanced by having knowledgeable individuals from responding agencies immediately available to respond to the changing situation.

Finally, a good plan should be simple. It eliminates all possibility for misunderstanding and is coordinated. Two steps help to insure that these prerequisites are met. The first step is to circulate the plan through all the divisions, sections, and agencies that have been designated responsibilities. Feedback after circulation will usually cause tha plan to be modified to correspond with the capabilities of the participants. A second circulation after modification has been made insures that the feedback was correctly understood and implemented.

The second step, to insure that the plan is coordinated, is to test it. The first test should include only supervisory personnel. This is called a command post exercise. During this test the main emphasis is to determine the feasibility of command and control plans, notification procedures, communications and inter-agency cooperation. The plan is again modified based on the results of this test. The second test includes all of the control force and should be based on a scenario of a simulated hostage situation. This test doubles as a training vehicle for the control force if it is done in a realistic manner. This would include using department "actors" to play the parts of the hostages and hostage-takers (role playing), actually acquiring equipment needed in accordance with the scenario and implementing all of the alternate courses of action directed in the plan. This second test will require additional modifications to be made to the plan. The resulting plan will give the department a well-thought out, coordinated response. Unfortunately, since organizations change, individuals within those organizations change and the state of the art is upgraded over time, the plan must be updated. Updating follows the same cycle of modifying, circulation, remodifying, testing and remodifying.

Sequence of Events

The first member of the control force to realize that a hostage situation is in progress will usually be a non-supervisory member. For this reason, all members of the control force should be trained in immediate action. This action is to take cover or protection from the hostage-taker's line of fire. If cover is not immediately available, concealment or protection from the hostage-taker's observation, should be sought. Immediate action also includes warning individuals in the immediate vicinity and reporting the incident. There is usually too little information available at this time to allow for offensive action so the control force should be instructed to maintain fire power control.

The reinforcements from the affected organization responding to the situation should be mobilized at a central location, rostered and assigned to isolate the immediate area. Unaffected individuals should now be evacuated from the immediate area by instructing them to use a route that will not cause them to cross the line of fire of the hostage-taker. Individuals that cannot be evacuated without exposing them to danger should be instructed to seek cover and await further orders. They can be later evacuated under the cover of darkness or smoke or can be extracted by using an armored car or bullet proof screens. Even though it may not be known at this time if the hostage-taker has firearms, it should be assumed that he has for the safety of all involved.

As more reinforcements, usually from supporting agencies, are mobilized, a second perimeter outside of the affected area should be set up. If the outer perimeter must be set up outside the jurisdiction of the prison, local police with appropriate authority must be used. Only control force personnel will be allowed to operate between the outer and inner perimeter and no one with the possible exception of the negotiator will be allowed inside the inner perimeter. A command post should be established and communication opened with the committed members of the control force.

At this time the situation is contained and communication should be opened with the hostage-taker. Although a trained hostage negotiator would be the best selection to open communications, one may not be available. If this is the case, a member of the control force who exhibits the ability to think clearly under stress, who is emotionally mature and who is a good listener should be selected. To determine which members of the control force exhibit these traits, recommendations should be solicited from control force supervisors. If the hostage-taker is known, consideration should be given to selecting a negotiator with whom he has developed rapport as long as that person can operate under stress and can be trusted.

Communications with the hostage-taker can be opened using any means of communication available. The limitations on the means of communication used is the consideration of its availability and its effect on the successful neutralization of the situation. For instance, providing the hostage-taker with a Citizens Band radio or a radio on

the control force's frequency can hinder the mission since the hostage-taker can communicate with the outside world or monitor and jam control force communications. Radio is an unsecure means of communications so consideration should be given to the use of the ordinary telephone. Telephone, especially of the military field type where the lines connect both instruments directly, will provide adequate security. If radio is used as a last resort, care should be taken to provide an instrument on a frequency which will allow communications with the control force only. The range of the radio should also be limited by mechanical manipulation. Before supplying a radio or any equipment, the control force should think of possible actions by the hostage-taker that could alter its frequency and range or turn it into a weapon. Other means of communication such as notes, posters or codes are only limited by the imagination of the control force, the ability of all participants to understand, and the dynamics of the situation.

The negotiator's primary mission at this point is to reduce the anxiety level of the hostage-taker and gather information while stalling for time. Initially it will be useful to establish the identity of the hostage-taker and his hostages. The negotiator should next determine the motivation and the demands. All information gathered may prove to be useful and should be recorded. The negotiator should plan for a long dialogue interspersed with quiet periods when the hostage-taker temporarily breaks off communication. All demands and information are relayed to the control force commander.

The commander should be guided by the department's policy limiting negotiable items. At the least, firearms or other weapons should be nonnegotiable and this should be clearly communicated to the hostage-taker when and only when the occasion arises. Other nonnegotiable items such as replacement hostages will be dictated by state or institution policy and the commander's commitment to his primary mission of insuring the safety of all concerned and his secondary mission of retaining control of the hostage-taker. The commander should keep in mind the fact that as the number of nonnegotiable items increases, his flexibility in negotiations decreases. He should also keep in mind an equally important fact which is that concessions, especially immediate concessions, raise the expectations and commitment of the hostage-taker. Concessions on larger demands will raise expectation and commitment more than concessions on smaller demands. To keep this delicate balance is a formidable challenge.

While the negotiator is buying time, the control force should be consolidating command and control by opening the Emergency Operations Center (EOC). Depending on the information available, a determination is made on what support will be needed. This support may range from additional negotiators, psychologists, criminologists to legal, medical, police, explosive ordinance disposal and firefighting support. The representatives of the supporting agencies are colocated at the EOC and support as needed. As additional information is received, additional supporting agencies are notified or existing agencies relieved. The EOC is tailored to fit the existing situation and remains flexible to be modified as the situation changes.

At this time emphasis is put into gathering intelligence. In addition to the information relayed by the negotiator, the staff coordinator makes arrangements to gather additional information on the hostages and the hostage-taker. A search of official records is made and friends and relatives of those affected are interviewed. Members of the control force and witnesses at the scene are also interviewed. Information can also be gathered through the use of photography and electronic eavesdropping devices such as spike michrophones. All information is disseminated to the commander and his advisors (think tank). Information disseminated to the control force is on a need-to-know basis.

The commander, with the advice of the "think tank," must determine the tactics he will use. If committed to a policy of negotiation, it should be pointed out that negotiated situations of from one to three weeks are not uncommon. Even if committed to a policy of negotiation, alternate tactics are prepared. If any of the more severe force options such as fire by selected marksmen, gas, assault or full firepower, are contemplated, consideration should be given to having these tactics carried out by personnel who have been trained in their use. If the prison does not have such a team, a local police department should be contacted for the use of their team. A specific plan must be drawn up for the use of the more severe force options and the team briefed and rehearsed. Logistics requirements will be generated at this stage. Sources of supply must be located.

The stage of the situation after containment has been accomplished and negotiations entered into is a stage marked with flexibility. The commander must be alert to seize opportunities as they arise. He constantly maneuvers for a tactical or psychological advantage. The situations which have come up are too numerous to list and the situations which may come up are innumerable. Past incidents, however, have a common thread. That connection is the fact that the longer the control force contains and negotiates the more advantages it accrues. More intelligence is gathered, transference makes it more unlikely that the hostages will be hurt and time allows the hostage-takers to make a mistake which the control force can capitalize on. In cases where multiple hostages are held, it is not unlikely that some will be released as messengers, as a trade for a concession made or as an act of good faith. Obviously less hostages are likely to be killed or injured if this occurs.

There is a significant disagreement in the field and in the literature as to whether the hostage-takers should be allowed to move to a new location with their hostages. Corrections does not allow movement outside of the prison because of the possibility of encouraging the development of future hostage situations and the increased danger to the hostages. The former contention has yet to be proven but the latter is supported by Middendorff (October-November, 1974) who believes the danger to

the hostages increases if the hostage-taker is allowed to move them. Fox (1972), on the other hand, cites a case in which the hostages were released four miles away from the prison and the hostage-takers were subsequently recaptured. Police are more prone to allow movement. They see the situation still contained since they escort the escape vehicle. They feel the situation is still under their control; the only difference being that it is in a mobile stage. This movement may also bring them a tactical advantage in that the move takes the hostage-taker out of an area which because of geography, buildings, structures, population, etc., makes control difficult, into an area which allows for more flexibility of maneuver and negotiations. It also takes the hostage-taker out of an area which he has become familiar into an area in which he is disoriented but where the control force is knowledgeable. This disorientation, on the other hand, can cause increased anxiety for the hostage-taker.

The state of knowledge does not, at this time, allow generalization as to whether movement is an advantageous tactic. There are some considerations which may assist the commander to make the decision. One advantage in allowing the move is that it may be a necessary concession to preclude injury to the hostages. An advantage in allowing movement in a multiple hostage situation is that the hostage-taker can only take a limited number of hostages with him. The reduction in the number of hostages reduces the number of people who may be killed or injured. A disadvantage is that it raises the hopes, expectations and anxiety and lowers the boredom of the hostage-taker. Another disadvantage is that containment of a moving vehicle is much more difficult than containment of a static situation and the hostage-taker may escape. Furthermore, it is hard to envision an alternate area outside of prison walls which would allow the high degree of control that prison authorities have inside the institution. Lastly, problems arise regarding authority as the vehicle travels through various legal jurisdictions. While the disadvantages seem to outweigh the advantages, the commander must be guided by the gravity of each in fulfilling his mission, i.e., primarily the safety of all concerned and secondarily control of the hostage-taker.

The decision to allow movement or not remains a very difficult one for the commander. If it is contemplated, however, certain procedures have been developed which enhance control of the situation. They are:

1. Secure new location—The hostage-taker will be arriving in an already contained location.

2. Select movement route—A route which allows the greatest ease of containment should be selected. Additionally, the route should not go through an area which would make containment difficult should the hostage-taker stop.

3. Select appropriate transportation for hostage-taker and hostages—Select a vehicle which will necessitate the greatest number of hostages to be left behind. The vehicle could also be outfitted with an ignition or gas line cut-off switch and/or a "beeper" which would allow electronic tracking and detection of its location.

4. Clear and secure movement route—This is usually done by control force vehicles in the lead, rear and on parallel routes.

5. Arrange for air surveillance—Care must be exercised in the selection of the route so that the escape vehicle is not blocked from air view by overpasses or trees. Obstructions may cut off the "beeper" signals or allow the vehicle to change direction without observation.

6. Notify responsible jurisdiction(s) at new site and along movement route.

7. Secure original location (crime scene) after move—This is necessary to preserve evidence and may produce intelligence which may help in dealing with the situation at the new location.

8. Consolidate new location after move—The same procedures used at the original location are used at the new location.

A problem that will face the control force throughout the incident is one of balancing the public's right to freedom of the press and the immediate mission at hand. There is abundant evidence that the news media can have a detrimental outcome on the incident if allowed to operate unbridled. Balton (1975-76) narrates a typical incident of news media interference:

> In a recent hostage situation at a Manhattan bank, the perpetrator, Ray Olsen, had talked to various newsmen on the phone. After hanging up, Olsen raised his weapon and threatened to shoot Bolz [New York City Police Department Hostage Negotiator]. 'They put him into a depression,' Bolz said. 'He was going to come out, but after they talked to him, he went into nosedive' (p. 2).

Similar interference occurred during the 1974 Huntsville, Texas prison hostage situation when one of the major national networks violated a requested news blackout and broadcast the fact that a firehose had been brought to the prison ("CBS Ignores Silence Request," August 4, 1974). The firehose was to be used to overturn a shield the hostage-takers had constructed to aide in their escape. According to prison authorities, the hostage-takers had a radio and could have heard the broadcast.

Police and corrections officials are not alone in their appreciation of the power of the press. One newsman testifying before the House Committee on Internal Security narrated this story:

> We had an example three weeks ago of the Black Liberation Army having printed so-called death warrants naming certain members of the media which were plastered on the sides of buildings. ... My own paper elected not to publish the story, not so much because of the fact my name happened to head the list of newspapermen who were to be done away with, but because it was apt to implant in the minds of some individuals not connected with the Black Liberation Army the thought 'Well, gee, we

should start open season on newspapermen' (U. S. Congress, House, **Terrorism, Part 3**, 1974, p. 3990).

He went on to point out that the remaining newspapers, television stations and radio stations in the area either ignored the story or printed and broadcast a watered down version.

As pointed out elsewhere in this study, publicity can be the element which could spark a hostage-taker with a revolutionary cause into violence. The variables are so numerous that the commander must insure that he has cooperation with the news media.

Simply refusing news media access to information will do nothing but antagonize relations. The media is likely to obtain information from other sources and publish or broadcast news that may or may not be substantiated. Cooperation is enhanced with the news media by initiating cooperation. They should receive a briefing of the situation and an explanation of why selective release and temporary suppression of news is necessary. Rapport with the news media, just as rappport with a person, does not build instantaneously. Since this takes time, a department which is sincerely interested will establish contact with the local news media in the planning stage and outline the procedures they will follow and the reasons for those procedures. Once professional contact is established, the institution should cooperate with periodic releases of newsworthy items. When the local media is confident that the institution is assisting them, they are more likely to assist the institution in crisis situations. This cooperation is important in a hostage situation since, not only local news media, but national news media may be on hand to cover the incident. Representatives from the national news media are more likely to cooperate with the prison officials if persuaded by their counterparts from the local media.

This procedure does not insure media cooperation but does enhance the possibility. Since, in this country, government officials cannot legally exercise full control over the media, cooperation is the goal. This cooperation can be enhanced by the appointment of a public information officer during the crisis. Many institutions are realizing the value of a public information officer in day-to-day operations and have one appointed on a full time basis or as an additional duty. Those departments that do not have this position should identify an individual on staff or in the community who is qualified to perform this function. There may be a retired or active newsman in the community who is sensitive to prison problems and volunteer his time and effort. Whatever source the institution uses the consideration is that it realizes the importance of cooperation with the news media during crisis situations.

Suggestions for Further Study

This study produced two main areas where further research is needed. The first area is in the development of "hardware" or equipment that would allow the control force to better cope with hostage situations. The second area is the development of "software" or a better understanding of human motivation and appropriate countermeasures that will bring a hostage situation to a peaceful conclusion.

The "hardware" most mentioned by the questionnaire respondents was an incapacitating gas or drug. The present inventory of gas and drug weapons is listed below.

A. Chemical Weapons—Chemicals can be disseminated by grenades, projectiles, cartridges or mechanical bulk dispensers. Effectiveness is determined by choice of proper delivery system to fit situation.
   1. CN
      a. Description: Conventional tear gas—alphachloroacetophenone.
      b. Effects: Causes choking, eye tearing, difficulty in breathing. Odor of apple blossoms.
      c. Current Use or Status: In use after World War I by military and many law enforcement agencies for crowd control and flushing out barricaded persons.
      d. Major Problems or Issues Requiring Research: Affected by weather conditions. Some temporary eye and skin injury reported when aerosol dispensers used at close range. Only limited effect on some persons.
   2. CS
      a. Description: Newest riot control, agent—orthocholorobenzalmalononitrile.
      b. Effects: More severe, faster acting and less toxic than CN. Also more persistent because the particles cling. In high concentrations will cause nausea and vomiting. Odor like pepper.
      c. Current Use or Status: Adopted by Army to replace CN in 1959. Used by many large police forces and institutions.
      d. Major Problems or Issues Requiring Research: Affected by weather conditions. Less public acceptance than CN because its effects are more severe. Decontamination is a problem when used indoors.
   3. DM
      a. Description: Diphenylaminechloroarsine.
      b. Effects: Violent nausea 30 minutes after use. Smoky odor. Since reaction is delayed, it is often mixed with CN for more immediate response.
      c. Current Use of Status: No longer in use by military due to risk.
      d. Major Problems or Issues Requiring Research: Effects are too violent and severe to justify civilian use.
   4. HC
      a. Description: Hexachlorethane; zinc oxide. Smoke delivered by grenades or smoke pot.
      b. Effects: Used to contain crowds by psychologically disorienting it members.

c. Current Use or Status: Some use by military but little use by civilian forces.

d. Major Problems or Issues Requiring Research: Indiscriminate effects on users as well as victim may hinder efforts to restore order.

B. **Systemic Drugs**

1. Dart Gun

a. Description: Modified shotgun or handgun in which the projectile is a drug-filled syringe activated by a small charge on impact. Wide variety of drugs available.

b. Effects: Drug immobilizes victim after several minutes delay.

c. Current Use of Status: Currently used only in capture of animals.

d. Major Problems or Issues Requiring Research: Amount needed for quick immobilization might be lethal dosage. Police skeptical of any weapon with delayed action (**Nonlethal Weapons for Law Enforcement: Research Needs and Priorities**, 1972, pp. 52-53).

A gas not listed above is one used in Great Britain known as CR (Monroe, 1976). Although specifications on this gas are partially classified, what is known is that it is a skin irritant, soluble in water and feels like scalding water hitting the skin. Its application to hostage situations is unknown at this time.

The gas or drug needed in hostage situations must comply with the following specifications:

A. Required Specifications.

1. Nonlethal. Dose or concentration will not kill, permanently injure or suffocate.
2. Instant incapacitation.
3. Undetectable if incapacitation is not instantaneous.
4. Mode of delivery available.
5. Protective devices available to control force.

B. Recommended Specifications.

1. Non-pyrotechnic to prevent against causing fires.
2. Ease of decontamination.

Recent inquiry into this area (Monroe, 1976) has not revealed a gas or drug which meets these specifications. The problem that has not been solved is developing an agent that has an instantaneous effect. Even the Federal Laboratories have been unable to come up with anything that could be used commercially.

Law Enforcement, especially, is interested in acquiring an instantaneously incapacitating, nonlethal gas or drug. This interest may spur private and government agencies into development of such an agent. Care should be taken, however, in considering such an agent as a panecea for hostage situations. History has shown that when technology produces a new piece of equipment it is just a matter of time until technology produces equipment to negate the original invention. The development of this agent then would be a viable tool only until an invention to counter its effects is developed. The length of time is dependent on the security involved in protecting the agent.

A parallel effort must be made to develop "software" in coping with hostage situations. Unlike "hardware" development, which has the attractiveness of being a positive and quick solution to the problem, research into human motivation and behavior merely reveals techniques which apply to a majority of people. They may or may not apply to any one individual person so an element of risk remains in their use. As "software" development becomes more complex the role of the negotiator becomes one of a specialist and the training involved more complicated.

One area in "software" that has received widespread acceptance is the concept of transference. Simply stated, the longer the hostage-takers and hostages are together, the less likely are the hostages to be injured or killed. This is because people together in a crisis situation develop interpersonal bonds with each other. These bonds are normally positive and have caused some hostages to side with the hostage-takers against the control force. Transference has caused many departments to adopt a policy of containment and negotiation based on the knowledge that the longer the hostage-taker is with his hostages, the less likely he is to injure or kill them. The use of this technique over adoption of a policy of use of force has increased the number of successful missions. Under the policy of restraint it has been assumed that if the hostage-taker kills a hostage he is not subject to transference and in order to save as many of the remaining hostages as possible, the control force must immediately use force. There is one terrorist hostage incident on record where a hostage was killed during negotiations but the control force decided to maintain their policy of restraint. The hostage-takers later surrendered themselves and released twenty-three hostages. The hostage that was killed had apparently been antagonistic toward the hostage-takers while the remaining hostages had been subject to mutual transference with them. The dead hostage had entered a negative relationship with his captors (counter-transference) while the remaining hostages entered the normal positive relationship found in a crisis situation. In this case it was one of the hostages not the hostage-takers who was not subject to transference. While it is impossible to generalize a sample of one, the area of counter-transference should be explored in further research for its application to the decision to use force or restraint after a hostage has been killed.

An area of research which may provide another tool for the control force is the use of women as hostage negotiators. Studies have confirmed that women are superior to men in empathy and observation and therefore judgment. They are also less threatening and seem to get along better with men, who are the majority of hostage-takers. Representative of current thought are the feelings of a Houston, Texas policewoman who:

> ... thinks female officers may have better luck communicating with prisoners and suspects than male officers. 'A lot of them, especially men, seem to calm down and go along easier with me than they do with men' (Foxhall, 23 May 1976, Sec.2, p. 4).

With the increased numbers of women in corrections and law enforcement, it seems that their use as negotiators should be explored. In cases where the hostage-taker refuses to talk to a woman, she can be used as an alternate negotiator to take advantage of her superiority in empathy, observation and judgment. One word of caution is due. Female superiority has been determined to be due to their greater interest in observing people. This interest may be due to sex or it may be due to environment. If it is due to environmental pressures, the more liberal female role in society today may have an effect on it. The effect on their interest is likely to reduce it as the female environment more closely resembles the male environment.

Summary

In dealing with people there are few absolute rules to follow. In dealing with people in crisis situations, there are even fewer rules that can be applied in one hundred per cent of the cases. There is an emerging set of considerations, however, that, if intelligently applied, can enhance the success of the control force in dealing with crisis situations. This thesis has explored those considerations that increase the possibility of success.

All prisons should certainly anticipate the possibility of being faced with hostage situations sometime in the future. It is also becoming evident that prisons are coming under increasingly close scrutiny of the courts, news media, and the public. With the knowledge that they will most likely face a hostage situation in the future and that their methods to cope with it will be scrutinized by society, it is incumbent on prison authorities to plan for them. As Kobetz (1974) points out:

> It is possible...to plan for crisis situations, anticipate them, and take steps to prevent escalation. We have learned through experience that urban riots and campus disorders can be averted by social planning and negotiating; we have also learned that civil disorders which do escalate because of a breakdown in communications can be quickly and properly contained by advance training of law enforcement personnel. This type of social planning, negotiating and personnel training can also be utilized in other types of 'crisis' situations... (p. ii).

With planning for hostage situations the department must operationally define its mission, that is, define its mission in terms that can be measured. This study has discovered that the mission in hostage situations is a twofold one. The primary mission is the safety of all concerned. The secondary mission is the control of the hostage-taker. Both missions can be measured.

With an operationally defined mission it is possible to develop detailed plans. These plans must cover all contingencies that have occurred in past hostage situations. Confusion that has occurred in past situations can be alleviated by forming an organization which delineates the chain of command. Each position in the organization should have a defined job description which includes limits of authority. The commander should delegate more responsibility than normal to his subordinates in the routine operation of the prison. This will allow him more time to devote to the hostage situation. Additions to the staff are necessary to shield the commander from the emotional impact of the situation so as not to taint his judgment. The addition of a hostage negotiator, public information officer and a staff coordinator shield the commander by communicating with the hostage-taker, the news media and the family of the hostages respectively. Another addition to the staff is a "think tank" which brainstorms the situation and recommends alternate courses of action.

The plan must also provide for additional financial requirements which are usually included in the budget as contingency funds. Additional equipment may also be needed. This problem is solved by developing a resources manual in the planning stage.

The problem of controlling diverse agencies responding to assist is solved by pre-designating an Emergency Operation Center (EOC). The EOC colocates agency representatives and their communications equipment to insure continuity of cooperation and to enhance communications.

Lastly, the plan must be staffed through all agencies affected, tested and periodically updated. Staffing and testing will cause the plan to be modified.

Although the commander must have flexibility to use any tactics which the situation dictates, the technique that has enjoyed the greatest popularity and success recently is to contain and negotiate. Negotiate used in this context does not refer to sophisticated verbal tactics. It simply means communicate and keep the hostage-taker in the problem solving process. No demands are completely rejected but constant delay is employed until sheer boredom and fatigue reduce the felon's commitment to stick to his demands. While the situation goes on through days and weeks, transference makes it more and more unlikely that the felon will injure his hostages. The more skilled the negotiator, the more likely that a compromise can be reached with the hostage-taker which is acceptable to the control force. This can reduce the time necessary to neutralize the situation. The negotiation technique simply trades time for the safety of the hostages and strives to reduce or eliminate the demands.

While developing sophisticated nonlethal weapons to end the situation quickly will prove to be a definite asset in coping with hostage situations, they are seen as a temporary advantage. Long-range success can best be assured by a deeper understanding of human motivation and behavior.

Outside of legislation prohibiting the granting of amnesty to hostage-takers the practitioners in the fields of law enforcement and corrections do not feel that the hostage problem can be "legislated away." They do not see laws making capital punishment mandatory or optional or laws prohibiting the payment of ransom as having a deterrent effect. This feeling and the feeling that the

greatest deterrent is the assurance of speedy apprehension, trial and punishment agrees with the literature.

Field practitioners do not feel a task force of specialists should be formed to cope with hostage situations. This strongly disagrees with current thought of psychologists and governmental officials (Walters, 1974). If the task force was formed field practitioners see its mission as training their personnel and advising the commander during an actual hostage situation. Not one respondent favored the task force to take over command of the situation. They prefer local control with only one respondent favoring formation of the task force at federal level.

While the task force proposal does not receive support in the field, the idea of forming a "think tank" of specialists to brainstorm the situation received widespread support. Since the concept of the task force and the "think tank" are similar, it is concluded that respondents are not so much against the concept as they are against an agency outside their department being given the authority to cope with the situation with the responsibility for the outcome remaining with the department.

This model for neutralizing prison hostage situations does not contain a panacea which can be applied automatically, without thought to all situations. It does contain tried and proven considerations from many disciplines which are modified to apply to the field of corrections. The military's principles of unity of command and objective had influence on this study as does their use of brainstorming in the decision making process and the importance they place on detailed planning. Law enforcement's use of crisis intervention tactics has also had an influence. The concept of command and control in crisis situations is credited to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. The appreciation of transference and other personal dynamics came generally from the discipline of psychology. These credits are not complete but indicate that the fields of corrections and law enforcement can take advantage of techniques used in each others, and other disciplines for a common goal.

This model is designed to increase the probability of success in a hostage situation. The considerations herein must be applied judiciously because each hostage-taker faced will be unique unto himself. As Nierenberg (1973) points out:

> While the individual man is an insoluble puzzle, in the aggregate he becomes a mathematical certainty. You can never foretell what any one man will do, but you can always predict with precision what an average number of men will be up to. Individuals vary but percentages remain constant (p. 36).

The considerations in this model address the aggregate. The formidable challenge of the commander is to determine how closely the hostage-taker he faces resembles the aggregate.

The author sincerely hopes that this study will be of benefit to the reader. He further hopes that it will spur additional study into this field.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Detective Schlossberg briefly outlines the New York City Police Department hostage negotiation program in his book **Psychologist With a Gun** (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, Inc., 1974).

[2]For a more complete discussion of the three main types of mentally troubled persons see William McCord and Joan McCord, **Psychopathy and Delinquency** (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1956).

[3]An in-depth discussion of the dyssocial offender is offered in James C. Coleman, **Abnormal Psychology and Modern Life** (Chicago: Scott Foresman and Company, 1964).

[4]Research needs and developments for nonlethal weapons are contained in the following documents: **Nonlethal Weapons for Law Enforcement: Research Needs and Priorities** (A Report to the National Science Foundation by the Security Planning Corporation, 1972); Joseph F. Coates, **Study S-271, Nonlethal Weapons for Use by U.S. Law Enforcement Officer,** Institute for Defense Analysis, Science and Technology Division, 1967; Kenneth Misevich, **Final Report, Advanced Development, XM-742 Soft RAG Projectile,** prepared for Edgewood Arsenal by Remington Arms Company, Incorporated, 1975. The RAG (Ring Airfoil Grenade) is a kinetic energy weapon incorporating an aerodynamic profile and can also deliver gas.

[5]Situational context refers to a strategy of making no assumptions about the situation. Actions are taken only after information is gathered and analyzed for its accuracy.

[6]The reader who is interested in further discussion of the transference phenomenon is directed to Middendorff, Wolf, "The Victimology of the Taking of Hostages," **Kriminalistik,** April, 1974, p. 145. Inmate-guard relationships in hostage situations are explored in the following articles: David G. Garson, "Force Versus Restraint in Prison Riots," **Crime and Delinquency,** Vol. 18, No. 4 (October, 1972), pp. 411-421; Fred Desroches, "Patterns in Prison Riots," **Canadian Journal of Criminology and Corrections,** Vol. 16, No. 4 (October, 1974), pp. 332-351; and John F. Else and Keith D. Stephenson, "Vicarious Expiation: A Theory of Prison and Social Reform," **Crime and Delinquency,** Vol. 20, No. 4 (October, 1974), pp. 359-372. All these articles conclude that after the initial period of violence associated with a prison riot or escape attempt, the guard hostages are treated very humanely by the inmates with some of the inmates assuming the responsibility of protecting the guards from other inmates. Also see, U.S. Congress, Senate, **Terroristic Activity, Part 5,** Hostage Defense Measures, 1975.

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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE COVER LETTER

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING QUESTIONNAIRE

QUESTIONNAIRE WITH RESPONSES

Sam Houston State University

GEORGE G. KILLINGER
Director

ANN P. BAKER
JAMES A. BARRUM
GEORGE BETO
BILLY W. BRAMLETT
HAROLD D. CALDWELL
JOHN A. COCOROS
GARY D. COPUS
ROLANDO DEL CARMEN
JERRY L. DOWLING
ERWIN GOREE ERNST
CHARLES M. FRIEL
EDWIN D. HEATH
RODNEY J. HENNINGSEN
GLEN A. KERCHER
DON E. KIRKPATRICK
PAULINE LOVELESS
LEO A. McCANDLISH
JOHN P. MATTHEWS
MERLYN D. MOORE
WAYLAND D. PILCHER
GREGORY F. RIEDE
JIMMY D. SHADDOCK
ROBERT A. SHEARER
S. SOURYAL
RAYMOND H. C. TESKE, JR.
ROBERT N. WALKER
DONALD J. WEISENHORN
JEANNE P. YOUNG

Institute Of Contemporary Corrections
And The Behavioral Sciences
HUNTSVILLE, TEXAS 77340

Recent trends seem to point out that hostage-taking is becoming increasingly more prevalent both in our cities and in our prisons. Furthermore, the "experts" are predicting an increase in terrorist activities during our nation's bicentennial. Of course, hostage-taking has been a favorite terrorist tactic for years.

Although there are many theories regarding the best techniques to neutralize hostage situations, little research has been done to verify the validity of these techniques. I am conducting such a research project with a survey of our nation's fifty largest cities and the state department of corrections of each of the fifty states. This research will develop a model of techniques and tactics which have proven successful in coping with hostage situations.

I am an active duty Army Military Police officer and an ex-instructor at the U.S. Army Military Police School's Civil Disturbance Orientation Course (SEADOC). This study is not, however, connected with the Department of Defense. It is being conducted through the Institute of Contemporary Corrections and the Behavioral Sciences which will be the repository for the completed study.

An abstract of the completed study is offered to each department that participates in the study by completing the questionnaire. If your department desires a copy of the abstract, please enter your department name in the appropriate space on the last page of the questionnaire and return it using the enclosed mailing label. I believe the effort to reply will prove to be worthwhile to you.

Due to the nature of most of the questions, the questionnaire should be completed by a member of your department who has the authority to affect the philosophy of the department regarding hostage situations. Whether that person be a supervisor or specialist is immaterial, as long as the answers reflect the best thought of the department in handling these situations.

This study, like all studies, has its time limitations. In order for it to be completed on schedule, the questionnaires must be received for tabulation prior to 15 April 1976. Your effort to return the questionnaire by that date is sincerely appreciated.

Cordially,

James P. Needham
Major, MPC
US Army

Enclosed:
Hostage Questionnaire
Return Mailing Label

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire has thirty-one questions on eight pages, subdivided into four parts—Policy and Experience, Philosophy, Negotiation, and Tactics. Please don't get turned off by the questionnaire's apparent length. It is not actually as long as it seems—much space was used to provide multiple answers so you can simply check an answer instead of writing a response. In some cases you will desire to elaborate; if there is not sufficient space on the page, please continue on a separate sheet of paper. Every comment you add is most welcome.

Please answer all questions. This is important for statistical purposes. Some questions may have more than one response; in these cases make as many reponses as you feel necessary. You may have no theory on some of the opinion questions. If this is the case, please do not leave it blank, but put a question mark (?) in front of the number of the question.

Since this is an area in which very little field research has been done, you may find that you have to put quite a bit of thought into some answers. For this reason it is recommended that, if your time permits, the questionnaire be completed over several days as opposed to completion in one sitting.

All questionnaire responses and related materials will be handled in a strictly CONFIDENTIAL manner. None of your department's material will be released nor will your department be mentioned in the finished research document without your expressed permission unless the reference was obtained from a document generally available to the public such as newspapers, magazines, Congressional testimony, etc. An abstract of the study will be made. It will not identify departments by name but will summarize the technqiues and tactics that have proven successful in coping with hostage situations. If you desire a copy of this abstract, check the space provided on the last page of the questionnaire and indicate the department and individual that the abstract should be sent to.

To complete this research project, the questionnaire and related materials must be returned by 15 April, 1976. Please use the enclosed postage paid, addressed mailing label (DA Label 18). Please mail the following items:

Questionnaire
Department hostage policy and/or procedure manuals
After-action reports of hostage situations
Newspaper clippings of hostage situations
Hostage training publications (if available)

DEFINITIONS:

CONTROL FORCE—Your departmental personnel with or without augmentation by other criminal justice agencies and/cr the National Guard.

HOSTAGE SITUATION—A situation where a person(s) is deprived of his or her liberty by another person(s) and they are situated at the same location which is known by the control force.

NEGOTIATION—That crisis intervention technique whereby there is a compromise between the demands of the hostage-taker and the concessions willing to be made by the control force for the peaceful resolution of a crisis It is **not** always giving in or never giving in.

Key:

T - Total Responses
P - Police Responses
C - Corrections Responses

QUESTIONNAIRE

HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

PART I - POLICY AND EXPERIENCE

1. Does your department have verbal or written policies or procedures to deal with hostage situations?
   Written: T-54%; P-56%; C-52%
   Verbal: T-35%; P-24%; C-44%
   No Policy: T-13%; P-24%; C-4%

   If policies or procedures are in writing, would you please include a copy with the return of this questionnaire?

2. Are there any political or supervisory policies that limit your range of options in dealing with hostage situations?
   Yes: T-23%; P-28%; C-20%
   No: T-73%; P-72%; C-74%
   Unknown: T-4%; P-4%; C-4%

   If yes, what are they? (Continue on separate sheet of paper if necessary)

   Police

   4% - Deadly Force Regulation
   4% - Life of Hostage most important
   4% - No movement allowed
   4% - No replacement hostages
   4% - No firearms supplied

   Corrections

   4% - No amnesty or negotiation
   4% - No movement allowed outside prison
   4% - No release of hostage-taker
   4% - State laws prohibit escape

3. Is higher authority receptive to active participation, if needed, in a hostage situation as opposed to viewing the situation solely as your department's problem?
   Yes: T-73%; P-56%; C-89%
   No: T-17%; P-32%; C-4%
   Unknown: T-8%; P-12%; C-4%

4. Do policies and procedures include coordination with other criminal justice agencies—state, local, and federal?
   Yes: T-77%; P-72%; C-81%
   No: T-17%; P-20%; C-15%

   If the answer to above question is Yes, are other agencies cooperative?
   Yes: T-73%; P-64%; C-81%
   No: T-0%; P-0%; C-0%

5. Do you feel that elaborate planning for hostage situations is justified, based on past incidences of situations, future trends, and sensitivity of situation?
   Yes: T-62%; P-76%; C-48%
   No: T-29%; P-8%; C-48%

6. Has your department handled any hostage situations in the last five years? (1972-1976)
   Yes: T-73%; P-76%; C-70%
   No: T-25%; P-24%; C-26%

   If the answer to above question is Yes, would you include a copy of after-action reports, critiques, lessons learned, or newspaper clippings?

PART II - PHILOSOPHY

7. Do you view hostage situations faced by police to be similar to hostage situations faced by prison authorities?
   Yes: T-46%; P-52%; C-41%
   No: T-52%; P-48%; C-56%

   If No, what are the salient differences? (Continue on separate sheet if necessary)

Police
12% - Prisons deal with groups and Police with single felons
04% - Prisons deal with employee hostages, Police with strangers

Corrections
15% - Prisoners are already isolated
15% - Prisoners are already known
07% - Prisoners are more unified
07% - Prison situations are well planned

Police
08% - Prison situations are planned while police are spontaneous
08% - Prisons deal in a fixed, known position while police situations could be anywhere
08% - Background information is known to prison authorities but usually not known to police
04% - Reasons for situation is more specific in prisons than to police
04% - Prisoners are aware of state policy while street felons are not
04% - Prisoners are less likely to have firearms
04% - Prisoners are already contained

Corrections
04% - Prison situations may stem from riots
04% - Demands may benefit entire prison population
04% - Prisons do not face a time limit
04% - Demands usually related to prison problems
04% - Situation affects all aspects of prison operation
04% - Prisons are affected less by societal reaction
04% - Police face civil liability
04% - Police have limited alternatives
04% - Prison officials know the area

8. What should be the control force mission/missions in handling hostage situations?
   Safety of the hostages: T-85%; P-92%; C-78%
   Apprehension of the hostage-taker: T-56%; P-52%; C-59%
   Preventing escape of the hostage-taker: T-64%; P-56%; C-70%
   Minimize casualties on both sides: T-62%; P-64%; C-59%
   Neutralizing the situation in the quickest possible time: T-64%; P-48%; C-78%
   Other (specify): T-19%; P-20%; C-19%

Police
04% - Play for time
04% - Negotiation
04% - Public Safety
04% - Minimize property damage

Corrections
07% - Document case for prosecution
04% - Play for time
04% - Public safety
04% - Return institution to normal

9. Who should have overall command at a hostage situation site?
   Normal supervisor in the chain of command: T-48%; P-36%; C-59%
   Commander of SWAT/Tactical Unit if committed: T-17%; P-32%; C-4%
   Negotiator if committed: T-2%; P-0%; C-4%

Split-command, i.e., one person in command of tactical element and one in command of negotiation element: T-21%; P-28%; C-15%
Other (specify): P-08% (04%-Field Commander, 04%-Captain)
Other (specify): C-26% (22%-Warden, 04%-Commissioner)

10. What option/options should be open to the control force in coping with a hostage situation?
Assault: T-83%; P-76%; C-89%
Gas: T-81%; P-72%; C-89%
Negotiations: T-87%; P-88%; C-85%
Fire by selected marksmen: T-77%; P-80%; C-74%
Full firepower: T-46%; P-52%; C-41%
Containment (waiting the situation out): T-75%; P-88%; C-63%
Drugged food: T-40%; P-44%; C-37%
Use of police-type dogs: T-35%; P-32%; C-37%
Less lethal weapons such as stun gun, taser, etc.: T-52%; P-36%; C-67%
Denial of food and water: T-62%; P-60%; C-63%;
Cutting off utilities: T-63%; P-64%; C-63%
Other (specify): P-08% (Unknown)

11. Should any one control force option be considered as standard procedure?
Yes: T-10%; P-12%; C-07%
That option is (specify)

Police	Corrections
08% - Containment	04% - Containment
04% - Negotiation	04% - Negotiation

No: T-88%; P-88%; C-89%
Each option is evaluated in accordance with the situation.

12. Do you feel a task force composed of criminologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, news media analysts, political analysts and military tactics advisors should be formed to respond to hostage situations?
Yes: T-17%; P-24%; C-11%
No: T-67%; P-64%; C-70%
Yes, but delete (specify specialty): T-12%; P-16%; C-07%

Police	Corrections
16% - News Media analyst	07% - News Media analyst
12% - Political analyst	04% - Political analyst
08% - Military advisor	04% - Military advisor
04% - Criminologist	04% - Criminologist
	04% - Psychologists

Yes, but add (specify specialty): T-02%; P-0%; C-04%
C-04% - Correctional advisor

13. If the answer to question 12 is Yes, at what level should the task force be formed?
Departmental level: T-13%; P-16%; C-11%
City/municipal level: T-10%; P-20%; C-00%
State level: T-10%; P-04%; C-15%
Federal level: T-02%; P-00%; C-04%
Unknown: T-04%; P-08%; C-00%

14. If such a task force is deemed desirable, what should its function/functions be?
Take over command of the situation: T-00%; P-00%; C-00%
Advise the existing commander: T-42%; P-40%; C-44%
Train department personnel prior to hostage situations: T-37%; P-60%; C-15%
Other (specify): T-02%; P-00%; C-04% (Publish written guidance)

15. Adoption of a policy of negotiation could result in which of the following: (Make one or more choices)
Lend credibility to the hostage-taker's actions: T-25%; P-04%; C-44%
Promote early release of the hostages after negotiations have begun: T-54%; P-76%; C-33%
Promote hostage-taking in the future: T-33%; P-12%; C-52%
Lessen hostage-taking in the future: T-17%; P-24%; C-11%
Has no effect on hostage-taking in the future: T-21%; P-40%; C-04%
Unknown: T-12%; P-08%; C-15%
Other (specify): T-08%; P-04%; C-11%

Police
04% - Gives guidelines and limitations to the department

Corrections
07% - Buys time
04% - Lessens danger to hostages

16. What item/items should be nonnegotiable?
Freedom of hostage-taker: T-56%; P-36%; C-74%
Firearms or other weapons: T-85%; P-92%; C-78%
Alcohol: T-52%; P-36%; C-67%
Drugs: T-58%; P-44%; C-70%
Replacement hostages: T-37%; P-48%; C-26%
Transportation away from hostage situation site: T-50%; P-32%; C-67%
Access to news media: T-15%; P-08%; C-22%
Food and drink: T-06%; P-04%; C-07%
Monetary ransom: T-40%; P-20%; C-59%
Ransom in other forms, i.e., release of "political prisoners," food giveaway, etc.: T-52%; P-32%; C-70%
Amnesty for hostage-taker: T-60%; P-48%; C-70%
No items should be nonnegotiable: T-08%; P-08%; C-07%

17. The physical location to conduct negotiations should be:
On the hostage-taker's home ground: T-12%; P-16%; C-07%
On the control force's home ground: T-19%; P-16%; C-22%
On neutral ground: T-31%; P-16%; C-44%
From each other's home ground using telephone, radio, public address systems, notes, etc., to communicate: T-37%; P-48%; C-26%
Unknown: T-13%; P-12%; C-15%
Other (specify): T-15%; P-20%; C-11% (Determined by negotiations with hostage-taker)

18. Do you consider any of the following assumptions to be valid ones on which to base control force strategy? (More than one response may be necessary.)
All hostage-takers want to escape: T-19%; P-24%; C-15%
The hostages may find a way to escape with the passage of time: T-48%; P-76%; C-22%
Hostage-takers must be mentally disturbed: T-13%; P-12%; C-15%
A hostage-taker's initial demands may not be what finally motivates him to surrender, i.e., initial demand may be for $100,000 and freedom but real motivation for surrendering is promise of reuniting with mother after surrender: T-71%; P-72%; C-70%
The hostages are more likely to be injured by the hostage-taker with the passage of time: T-25%; P-12%; C-37%
The hostages are less likely to be injured by the hostage-taker with the passage of time: T-56%; P-84%; C-30%
Time is on the side of the control force: T-63%; P-88%; C-41%
If the hostage-taker has killed a hostage or a member of the control force, negotiations will be fruitless and another option should be implemented (assault, gas, fire by selected marksmen, etc): T-48%; P-48%; C-48%
If the hostage-taker has killed a hostage or a member of the control force, negotiations are still the best way of neutralizing the situation: T-15%; P-24%; C-07%
If a hostage-taker is allowed to move his hostages from the site of the original incident, he is more likely to injure the hostages: T-25%; P-28%; C-22%
Immediate concessions to some or all of a hostage-taker's demands will raise his expectations and hinder the final negotiated settlement in favor of the control force: T-37%; P-32%; C-41%
Unarmed hostage-takers should be subdued without use of lethal force before they can get organized: T-50%; P-40%; C-59%
Other (please elaborate): T-02%; P-04%; C-00% (Unknown)

19. Media coverage of hostage situations encourages future hostage situations.
Agree: T-73%; P-76%; C-70%
Disagree: T-21%; P-20%; C-24%
Unknown: T-08%; P-12%; C-04%

20. If the news media is allowed to sit in on and cover the negotiations:
Possibility of a negotiated settlement would be increased: T-08%; P-04%; C-11%
Possibility of a negotiated settlement would be decreased: T-48%; P-32%; C-63%
There would be no effect on possibility of negotiated settlement: T-13%; P-16%; C-11%
Other (please specify): T-08%; P-12%; C-00% (P-08%—Demands on perpetrator's motivation. P-04%—Reveals control force tactics)
Unknown: T-19%; P-32%; C-07%

21. News media should be included when planning for hostage situations so as to coordinate selective release or temporary suppression of information concerning hostage situations:
Agree: T-58%; P-64%; C-52%
Disagree: T-40%; P-36%; C-44%

22. In your experience, does the news media cooperate with your department in the handling of sensitive situations like hostage situations?
Yes: T-40%; P-36%; C-44%
No: T-06%; P-08%; C-04%
News media would honor some but not all our requests: T-54%; P-60%; C-48%
Other (please specify): T-04%; P-04%; C-04% (P-04%—If they knew the reason. C-04%—Unknown)

23. Do you feel that any/all of the following actions would be an effective deterrent for potential hostage-takers?
Make capital punishment **mandatory** for hostage-takers: T-21%; P-20%; C-22%
Make capital punishment **optional** for hostage-takers: T-10%; P-04%; C-15%
Prohibit the payment of ransom to hostage-takers: T-38%; P-28%; C-48%
Prohibit the granting of amnesty to hostage-takers: T-52%; P-44%; C-59%
Assure speedy apprehension, trial and punishment: T-77%; P-76%; C-78%
Other (please specify): T-10%; P-12%; C-07% (Unknown)

24. Do you feel that more research is needed for "hardware" to cope with hostage situations, i.e., development of a gas which will instantly incapacitate but will have no dangerous side effects, or time-delay drugs which would temporarily render a person unconscious one or two hours after it was administered?
Yes: T-58%; P-64%; C-52%
No: T-37%; P-36%; C-37%

If the answer is Yes, what specific item/items would you like to see developed?

Police
44% - Incapacitating gas or drug
04% - Criteria—nonlethal, stable, easy to administer, undetected

Corrections
37% - Incapacitating gas or drug
04% - Nonlethal weapons
04% - Sound disorientation
04% - Tranquilizers
04% - Electronic monitor
04% - Infrared devices
04% - Heat sensitivity devices
04% - Xray device
04% - Preventative security devices

25. Do you feel that more research is needed for "software" to cope with hostage situations, i.e., development of better understanding of human motivation and appropriate counter-measures that will bring a hostage situation to a peaceful conclusion?
Yes: T-75%; P-76%; C-74%
No: T-21%; P-24%; C-19%
Unknown: T-02%; P-00%; C-04%

PART III - NEGOTIATION AND NEGOTIATORS

26. The most important trait/traits for hostage negotiators is/are:
    - Pleasing physical appearance: T-13%; P-16%; C-11%
    - Authoritative physical appearance: T-23%; P-08%; C-37%
    - Good physical condition: T-21%; P-24%; C-14%
    - Age: T-33%; P-32%; C-33%
        - 20-25 years old: T-00%; P-00%; C-00%
        - 25-30 years old: T-04%; P-04%; C-04%
        - 30-35 years old: T-15%; P-12%; C-19%
        - 35-40 years old: T-17%; P-16%; C-19%
        - 40-45 years old: T-17%; P-08%; C-26%
        - Over 45 years old: T-04%; P-00%; C-07%
    - Sex: T-44%; P-40%; C-48%
        - Male: T-44%; P-40%; C-48%
        - Female: T-17%; P-20%; C-15%
    - Marksmanship ability: T-06%; P-12%; C-00%
    - Bilingual ability: T-29%; P-44%; C-15%
    - Volunteer: T-31%; P-48%; C-15%
    - Experience in Department: T-40%; P-28%; C-52%
    - Emotional maturity: T-81%; P-84%; C-78%
    - Ability to think clearly under stress: T-87%; P-92%; C-81%
    - General practical intelligence (street-wise): T-62%; P-64%; C-52%
    - Verbal ability (good talker): T-65%; P-80%; C-52%
    - Good listener: T-75%; P-84%; C-67%
    - Integrity/credibility: T-73%; P-60%; C-85%
    - Ability to avoid emotional involvement: T-63%; P-64%; C-63%
    - Commitment to negotiation program: T-50%; P-64%; C-37%
    - Ability to cope with uncertainty: T-62%; P-68%; C-56%
    - Ability to persuade: T-71%; P-80%; C-63%
    - Planning ability: T-37%; P-44%; C-30%
    - Must be in actual position of authority, i.e., must have authority to make decisions: T-33%; P-08%; C-56%
    - Unknown: T-06%; P-08%; C-04%
    - Other (please specify): T-04%; P-04%; C-04% (P-04%—Knowledge of human behavior. C-04%—Actor)

27. What area/areas should hostage negotiators be trained in?
    - Psychological training: T-81%; P-92%; C-70%
    - Physical training: T-21%; P-28%; C-15%
    - Marksmanship training: T-13%; P-28%; C-00%
    - Unarmed self-defense: T-33%; P-52%; C-15%
    - First aid: T-23%; P-36%; C-11%
    - Pursuit driving: T-08%; P-12%; C-04%
    - Training in operation of public address system, beeper device, tape recordings, armored car, wireless transmitter, etc.: T-29%; P-48%; C-11%
    - Role playing or stress training: T-69%; P-76%; C-63%
    - Attendance at other departments' training: T-31%; P-40%; C-22%
    - Unknown: T-06%; P-04%; C-07%
    - Other (please specify): T-13%; P-12%; C-15%

Police
- 04% - Negotiation process
- 04% - Read after-action reports
- 04% - Tactics and options

Corrections
- 04% - Know inmates
- 04% - Know department policy
- 04% - Know department resources

28. Should more than one negotiator respond to a hostage incident?
    - No: T-23%; P-04%; C-41%
    - Yes, to protect against fatigue of primary negotiator: T-44%; P-56%; C-33%
    - Yes, to provide for multi-language capability: T-27%; P-36%; C-19%

Yes, to allow for one to talk while one plans strategy: T-40%; P-48%; C-33%
Yes, to monitor primary negotiator's mood, i.e., getting emotional, etc.: T-40%; P-56%; C-26%
Unknown: T-08%; P-08%; C-07%
Other (please specify): T-10%; P-12%; C-07%

Police
04% - Because of differing abilities
04% - To keep records
04% - To coordinate the effort

Corrections
04% - Because of differing abilities
04% - To keep dialog going

29. Should the negotiator be:
The final decision maker: T-12%; P-00%; C-22%
A semi-authoritative figure; can make limited decisions and concessions: T-56%; P-68%; C-44%
Without decision-making authority: T-31%; P-36%; C-26%
Other (please specify): T-04%; P-00%; C-07% (Unknown)

30. Match the type of hostage negotiator that you feel is likely to be most successful in dealing with the type of hostage-taker listed below. Match by placing the letter corresponding to the hostage negotiator in the right column to the hostage-taker in the left column. Assume all the hostage negotiators have equal skill with the only variable being their race and sex. (A type of negotiator may be used more than once.)

Hostage Taker

White male: T-50% (A); P-64% (A); C-37% (A)
White female: T-33% (B); P-44% (B); C-22% (B)
Black male: T-50% (C); P-68% (C); C-41% (C)
Black female: T-33% (D); P-44% (D); C-22% (D)
Mexican-American male: T-52% (E); P-64% (E); C-41% (E)
Mexican-American female: T-38% (F); P-48% (F); C-30% (F)
Puerto Rican male: T-52% (G); P-64% (G); C-41% (G)
Puerto Rican female: T-31% (H); P-44% (H); C-26% (H)
Arabic male: T-52% (I); P- 64% (I); C-41% (I)
Arabic female: T-33% (J); P-44% (J); C-22% (J)
Other (specify): T-33%; P-28%; C-37% (Unknown)
Other (specify): T-08%; P-00%; C-15% (Irrelevant)
Other (specify): T- 04%; P-08%; C-00% (Depends on acceptance of hostage-taker)

Hostage Negotiator

A. White male
B. White female
C. Black male
D. Black female
E. Mexican-American male
F. Mexican-American female
G. Puerto Rican male
H. Puerto Rican female
I. Arabic male
J. Arabic female
K. Other (specify)
L. Other (specify)
M. Other (specify)
N. Other (specify)

PART IV - TACTICS

31. Assuming a hostage situation of major significance, which of the following actions/action should be taken?

Response Phase (Action taken by the control force upon initial notification that a hostage situation exists)

Isolate the area: T-94%; P-100%; C-89%
Call for reinforcements: T-69%; P-72%; C-67%
Establish mobilization point/field command post: T-83%; P-92%; C-74%
Roster reinforcements, assign missions and establish communications: T-75%; P-80%; C-70%
Establish inner and outer perimeter: T-75%; P-84%; C-67%
Call for SWAT or special tactical unit: T-67%; P-88%; C-48%
Call for hostage negotiator: T-71%; P-88%; C-56%
Call for ambulance and medical support: T-75%; P-84%; C-67%
Evacuate unaffected building occupants: T-81%; P-84%; C-78%
Establish crowd control: T-69%; P-84%; C-56%
Maintain firepower control: T-69%; P-84%; C-56%
Other (please specify): T-06%; P-12%; C-00% (04% - Rumor control, 04% - Firefighting support, 04% - Take witnesses to command post)

Consolidation Phase (Action taken by control force after initial response is made)

Position selected marksmen and gas grenadiers: T-71%; P-72%; C-70%
Establish communication with hostage-taker: T-87%; P-92%; C-81%
Establish identity of hostage-taker and hostages: T-88%; P-88%; C-89%
Obtain building floor plans: T-79%; P-88%; C-70%
Develop assault plan: T-77%; P-76%; C-78%
Rehearse assault plan: T-48%; P-56%; C-41%
Establish "Think Tank" (specialists to advise commander regarding technique): T-67%; P-64%; C-70%
Question building occupants and escaped or released hostages: T-83%; P-84%; C-81%
Question acquaintances of hostage-taker and hostages: T-79%; P-84%; C-74%
Establish control force rotation plan: T-58%; P-68%; C-48%
Determine logistics requirements and identity equipment sources: T-67%; P-72%; C-63%
Other (please specify): T-02%; P-04%; C-00% (Unknown)
Other (please specify): T-02%; P-04%; C-00% (04% - Give tactical command to SWAT.)

Movement Phase (If movement is allowed for tactical or psychological advantage)

Secure new location: T-54%; P-76%; C-33%
Select movement route: T-60%; P-80%; C-41%
Select appropriate transportation for hostage-taker and hostages: T-54%; P-76%; C-33%
Clear and secure movement route: T-52%; P-64%; C-41%
Arrange for air surveillance: T-48%; P-72%; C-26%
Notify responsible jurisdiction(s) at new site and along movement route: T-52%; P-72%; C-33%
Secure original location (crime scene) after move: T-52%; P-72%; C-33%
Consolidate new location after move: T-48%; P-64%; C-33%
We would not allow movement: T-38%; P-20%; C-56%
Other (please specify): T-06%; P-04%; C-07% (Unknown)
Other (please specify): T-04%; P-00%; C-07% (07% - Permit movement within prison only)

THANK YOU!

We realize that this was not an easy questionnaire to fill out. Your time, patience, and professional expertise is truly appreciated.

_____PLEASE CHECK HERE IF YOU DESIRE AN ABSTRACT OF THIS STUDY.

Results should be sent to: _____
Name of Department

Attention: _____
Name of Individual